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ABSTRACT
Givens, Adam Thomas. M.A., Department of History, Wright State University, 2011.
The Air Close to the Trees: Evolution and Innovation in U.S. Army Assault Helicopter
Units during the Vietnam War.

Throughout the Vietnam War the United States Army‘s use of assault helicopters was
unprecedented in modern warfare. Although planners originally anticipated their
utilization on a European battlefield rather than against an insurgency, Army Aviation
adapted, allowing them to overcome an uncertain future. Due to the unconventional
nature of the conflict, continual revisions in tactics, techniques, and procedures ensured
that assault helicopter doctrine was never concrete, but always shifting. Multiple factors
influenced these developments, and manifold channels of dissemination allowed combat
knowledge ultimately to influence training and doctrine. This thesis finds that previous
works focus too heavily upon the initial large-scale airmobile battle, ignoring the more
profound aspects of later experiences. Using memoirs, official Army documents, service
journals, and personal papers, it argues that innovation amongst assault helicopter units
occurred throughout the entirety of the American involvement in Vietnam, signifying a
youthful Army Aviation that was amenable to varied and innovative thinking from within
its ranks.
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INTRODUCTION
Few of America‘s past wars have engendered as much passion, continued
supposition, and even confusion as the Vietnam War. Indeed, the name itself is for some
descriptive of an ill-advised endeavor – an era of torment or an unending conflict with no
discernable end. If Vietnam is synonymous with a situation gone wrong, then there is one
central image which has become a ubiquitous symbol of the American presence in
Southeast Asia: the helicopter. Its rotor noise was the soundtrack for a generation sent to
fight in the region‘s forests, jungles, and rice paddies. Nightly news reports often brought
combat to the nation‘s living rooms, and more often than not helicopters were the central
image depicted, further connecting war and machine in the public consciousness.
Arguably, few symbols have become so inextricably linked to a conflict in which United
States forces were involved.
This thesis argues that, rather than enjoying comprehensive formulaic
employment, assault helicopter tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the United
States Army during the Vietnam War underwent continual revision. It posits that this was
not only a product of combat expediency, but the result of open-mindedness within Army
Aviation which allowed new ideas to become useful doctrine. Much of the previous
literature on airmobility details the evolution of the concept preceding Vietnam, but few
trace the Army‘s evolution of techniques, tactics, and procedures throughout the war.
Incorrectly, one might assume from this historiographical lacuna that helicopter crews‘
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standard operating procedures remained in stasis and were standardized throughout
Vietnam, leaving nothing of any great importance worth examining. There is much to be
learned, though, from an analysis of the era between American escalation and
withdrawal.
The 1950s and early 1960s witnessed considerable theorizing and testing by the
Army regarding the employment of helicopters on a modern field of battle. The entire
concept of utilizing the aircraft as troop carriers was a product of the Cold War – military
planners intended to use them on a European battlefield against large-scale communist
incursions, not in Southeast Asia against an insurgency. As a result of an immediate need,
however, Army forces adapted airmobility operations to the ―brushfire war‖ mentality of
small regional conflicts.
The 1st Cavalry Division, the first airmobile division, garners the lion‘s share of
notice in the historical record. Their combat debut in late 1965 and subsequent first
victory during the Battle of Ia Drang is without doubt a groundbreaking moment – it
upheld over a decade of prior theorizing about the airmobility concept. Yet, Ia Drang
signaled only the beginning of assault helicopter‘s wide-scale usage and evolution during
the Vietnam War. Army Aviation‘s extensive use of rotary-wing aircraft was not a fait
accompli, nor was their implementation something they inherently knew how to
accomplish easily. It took considerable efforts by those among the aviation and ground
forces to translate experiences into agreed-upon doctrine.
Most scholars have done an excellent job detailing the bureaucratic measures
which fostered the development of the helicopter and its first large implementation by the
1st Cavalry. Regarding airmobility‘s transition to its role in counterinsurgency, however,
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there are far fewer studies. With that in mind, multiple questions drive this work: namely,
how well did the Army‘s ideas about the employment of helicopters hold up under the
stresses of combat? How did tactics and doctrine evolve, what caused them to change,
and what were the mechanics which allowed the implementation of new ideas? Broadly
speaking, was the Army interested in using Southeast Asia as a test-bed for universal
doctrine or did they intend to keep tactical lessons applicable to Vietnam strictly within
that theater? By addressing and answering these questions, this thesis intends not to find
fault in previous treatments but to augment them in an attempt to fill a historiographical
gap.
Among the varied literature, one of the best scholarly works to explore preVietnam Army Aviation is historian Christopher C.S. Cheng‘s Air Mobility. He offers a
thorough examination of doctrine and organization from 1942 through 1965. Cheng ends,
though, at the initial large-scale involvement of American forces in Vietnam, leaving
many questions unanswered about how doctrine changed after battlefield experiences. He
concludes at 1965 ―because the creation of an air mobile division can represent the
fulfillment of an innovation.‖1 It may be true that the initial vision of airmobility was
fulfilled in that year, though one wonders about the performance of the concept. Cheng
ends his work at the headwaters of some of the most rapid innovation the air assault
concept underwent during the war.
The same abrupt conclusion to Cheng‘s work is present in another equally
respectable analysis. John M. Carland‘s Association of the United States Army-sponsored
paper, ―How We Got There: Air Assault Warfare and the Emergence of the 1st Cavalry
1

Christopher C.S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994),
xiv.
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Division (Airmobile), 1950-1965,‖ details the emergence of the airmobile concept, but
also ends before its battlefield application.2 Despite this thorough analysis, the era
between the 1st Cavalry‘s activation and what they experienced during combat is still
overshadowed by the revolutionary aspect of the airmobile division. It is important to
examine how their combat experience affected later actions, or how well the division‘s
extensive training prepared them for fighting North Vietnamese regulars and what they
did as a result to address lessons learned.
Other works closely related to Carland‘s also deal with the developmental stage.
Bureaucratic pressures in the early 1960s from Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara led to a reevaluation of the Army‘s ability on the modern battlefield.
McNamara ordered large-scale testing to determine the applicability of the helicopter into
airborne operations and the Army commissioned the Howze Board to outline
recommendations for forming dedicated airmobile units.3 Mark A. Olinger‘s Institute of
Land Warfare Paper ―Conceptual Underpinnings of the Air Assault Concept‖ elucidates
well the governmental pressures to develop airmobility.4 He ends in 1964, however,
when the stateside testing concluded and the Army formed the first airmobile division.
John R. Galvin‘s Air Assault also highlights the development of airmobility. Like
Cheng and Carland, the author covers the birth of the concept, but begins earlier, tracing
its lineage to World War II parachute operations. Only the final twenty pages of the 360
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John M. Carland, ―How We Got There: Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1st Air Cavalry Division
(Airmobile), 1950-1965,‖ The Land Warfare Papers, no. 42 (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare,
2003).
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The Board‘s name derives from its Chairman, Major General Hamilton H. Howze, who became the first
Director of Army Aviation. Officially it was called the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board.
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Mark A. Olinger, Conceptual Underpinnings of The Air Assault Concept: The Hogaboom, Rogers and
Howze Boards, The Land Warfare Papers, no. 60W (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, 2006).

5
total, however, deal specifically with the post-1965 era. Published in 1969, Galvin could
only cover some aspects of the Vietnam War, and to expect his work to contain a detailed
interpretive analysis of the continual developing nature of airmobile operations is perhaps
unrealistic. However, his research is helpful in outlining the transformation from an
Army which relied upon large-scale airborne assaults by parachute to one which
developed a dependency on helicopters.
Perhaps the most authoritative examination of the employment of helicopters in
Vietnam is Lieutenant General John J. Tolson‘s Airmobility.5 A central figure in Army
Aviation, Tolson gives a detailed history of how doctrine transformed from the
theoretical to the battlefield-proven. An Army-commissioned study published in 1972,
his work deals broadly with all aspects of airmobility and its development. While it may
be the best overall look at the helicopter‘s role throughout Vietnam and the subsequent
evolution of its application, there are many aspects which he deals with only in passing.
He pays little attention to the actual mechanics of gathering information learned on the
battlefield and how the Army disseminated those lessons for inclusion in training
programs. The lack of historical distance, the author‘s own personal relation to the
subject matter, and the fact that is a governmental history constrict what is otherwise the
authoritative work on airmobility.
Such dedicated analysis of the formative era of heli-borne warfare is useful to
understand the framework which existed in the early usage of airmobility in Vietnam.
Most works agree that airmobility was one of the most significant innovations to come
out of the war in Southeast Asia. Despite this near universal conformity, however, few
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John J. Tolson, Airmobility, 1961-1971 (Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 1973).
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works have attempted to understand the profound expansion and progression of
helicopter usage other than through superficial examinations of battlefield expediencies.
The maturation of airmobility was not an accomplished fact when the 1st Cavalry
Division landed in 1965. Rather, throughout the war, and even into 1971, Army Aviation
continually learned and refined their assault helicopter tactics and techniques.
In order to understand that Army Aviation did not arrive in Southeast Asia with a
solid framework of how to fight an insurgency, the first chapter offers an historical
overview of the era preceding large-scale operations in Vietnam. It is largely an
institutional history which traces not only the early difficulties of helicopter proponents,
but illustrates how important Vietnam was to solidifying the use of helicopters as a viable
combat asset. Army Aviation‘s ascendancy to become a respected force was not easy. A
mixed reaction Army-wide regarding helicopters began in the 1950s, continuing into the
1960s. This is not particularly surprising, though, as groundbreaking military
advancements often meet some amount of obduracy and dubiety – mechanized warfare in
the interwar period and Billy Mitchell‘s own struggles are only two examples. Extensive
use of helicopters in Vietnam proved no different.
The Army found themselves pulled in two opposite directions, requiring them to
prepare for a European war while also remaining capable of fighting any other
contingency. Forming a general purpose airmobility capability was easier said than done.
By and large the Army focused more intently on a European foe, believing that
preparations against a sophisticated enemy could be easily adapted to meet a lessadvanced opposition. With that mindset they sent the first helicopters to the Republic of
Vietnam in 1961. From a small commitment of three dozen aircraft, their numbers grew
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exponentially in the following years, proving detractors wrong who believed the
helicopter had little utility beyond a simple logistical or medical evacuation platform.
While simultaneous testing and support for their use in a European war continued, the
demands of Vietnam ultimately eclipsed those plans.
Army Aviation adjusted rapidly to a counterinsurgency. With the airmobile
division‘s successful employment, Europe became an ever-more distant worry. In that
way, rotary-wing aircraft found new purpose and immediate usefulness in an
environment far removed from the one originally envisioned. The 1st Cavalry Division‘s
success allowed for a speedy expansion of Army Aviation, as the overall American
commander in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, believed helicopter mobility
was the panacea to the perplexing insurgency quandary. Ia Drang and the larger Pleiku
Campaign in which that battle took place offered many lessons. Foremost among them
was that airmobility, while proven effectual in a non-conventional setting, still had jagged
edges in need of smoothing – something only further combat could provide.
Chapter two discusses Army Aviation‘s acclimation to a counterinsurgency.
Throughout the Vietnam War, assault helicopter units continually adapted and refined
their tactics and procedures. Four main factors influenced these developments: the
Army‘s increasing reliance on helicopters to fight a war of attrition meant they took on
more pronounced roles, requiring alterations in procedures and tactics; large-scale
employment of the aircraft meant both the aviation and infantry communities had to learn
how to interact with one another – helicopter units had to ―educate‖ their ground
counterparts about how to use them properly; attempts to standardize techniques and
procedures were not easily accomplished due to varied geographic and tactical
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environments; and, finally, the enemy‘s ability to revise their own methods necessitated
commensurate tactical and procedural responses from helicopter units. Prior scholarship
hints at these realities in varying degrees, but mostly in terms of technological
developments.
Army Aviation‘s concerted efforts to develop reliable doctrine can be found in the
methods they used to disseminate their insights. Chapter three examines the varied ways
that ideas, observations, and combat knowledge found a wide audience during Vietnam.
It argues that without these communication networks, innovation and revision could not
have been as quick or dynamic. Through official reports, service journals, stateside
training, and in-country orientation, the Army was able to gather, disseminate, and
redistribute a vast array of data. By taking advantage of multiple channels of
communication, Army Aviation tied doctrine, training, and even personnel issues closely
with the war in Vietnam. In many cases these multifarious ideas and methods never made
it into official Army manuals. This thesis does not examine such source material in-depth
for this reason, but also because manuals are fundamentally the ultimate destination for
well-regulated ideas.6 They constitute an official articulation of doctrine and tactics
which, while informative, fail to illuminate the pace of change, the nuanced thought
emanating from the combat zone, and the degree to which real innovation took place.
In addition to Army Aviation‘s communication of thoughts amongst themselves,
their youth compared to their more established service branch brethren also proved

6

To an extent the Army understood the impossibility of detailing all the varied methods available to the
helicopter pilot. The 1969 field manual, FM 1-105: Army Aviation Techniques and Procedures, makes
known that it provides only ―condensed coverage‖ of only the ―basic methods.‖ Furthermore, the staff who
compiled the manual understood that the ―variations and combinations the aviator may use in adapting to
the many situations to be encountered are almost limitless.‖ Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-105:
Army Aviation Techniques and Procedures (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1969), 1-1.
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beneficial. Given the nascence of airmobility and their developing use of helicopters in
such significant roles, there were few impediments to formulating doctrine. One would
have been hard pressed to find obstinate traditionalists upholding a battle-tested approach
versus a revised method. Indeed, in the early years of the Vietnam War there was no
battle-tested experience to fall back upon, no historic precedent of U.S. assault
helicopters in a counterinsurgency role. As a consequence, most aviators were open to
somewhat radical ideas.
This work focuses on Army assault helicopters for specific reasons, the principal
one being because they represent the central element of the airmobility concept. 7 Though
all helicopters assisted ground units in some manner, the utility helicopter, which made
up the bulk of assault helicopter battalion, companies, and platoons, was the most widelyused aircraft during the Vietnam War. These aircraft – most often after 1965 the Bell UH1 ―Huey‖ – hauled troops to and from the combat zone; carried munitions, supplies, and
equipment to ground troops; acted as command and control aircraft for greater tactical
control; and generally fulfilled whatever role needed. Indeed, the hallmark of the assault
helicopter unit was their inherent versatility, which the Army believed ―should not be
restricted to a single type operation.‖8 When viewed in this light, assault helicopters were
the most versatile of all the helicopters employed in Southeast Asia. The Army‘s Huey
was also the most visible aircraft of the Vietnam War, the iconic image. The Vietnam
Helicopter Pilots Association reports that of the 10,005 production Hueys, the Army took
receipt of 9,216 of them, the majority being troop-carrying variants. While the other
7

The term ―assault helicopter‖ is intended as a catch-all. Technically, the Army‘s designation of such
aviation units changed throughout the war, from Transportation, to Air Mobile (Light), and finally Assault
Helicopter. Their functions and roles were not affected by any re-designations.
8

United States Army Aviation School, Common Subjects and Reference Data for Army Aviation in the
Field Army, January 1968 (Fort Rucker, AL: United States Army Aviation School, 1968), 81.
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service branches also used the Huey, the Marine Corps was the second most prevalent
user of the aircraft behind the Army with only 127 in their inventory.9 The sheer number
of these helicopters used by the Army, their wide usage, and their centrality to airmobility
makes it important to examine the use of the assault helicopter in-depth.
Other types of Army rotary-wing aircraft experienced innovation and alterations
in role and method as well. One should not underestimate the groundbreaking nature of
the attack helicopter (AH), cargo helicopter (CH), and observation helicopter (OH).
There still remains a wealth of information hidden in the historical record about these
helicopters in Vietnam, not yet illuminated by historians of this topic. In the interest of
scope and space, though, this study must only shine a weak beam on a comparably small
issue; regardless of the many aspects of airmobility, it focuses on a central facet of the
concept‘s innovation. Furthermore, library shelves strain under the weight of works
which detail perceived errors by the Army in both how they viewed and executed the
war. This project‘s intent is not to determine whether the Army‘s wide use of assault
helicopters was the proper approach or not, but how the aircraft, men, and institution met
the challenges they faced. To that end, discussions of overarching national policy,
strategy, and policy of the United States are confined to their relation to Army assault
helicopters.
It is at this point necessary to define the terminology common to studies of this
topic. The terms ―air assault‖ and ―airmobility‖ are used interchangeably. Some made
distinctions in the early era of the airmobility debate. Air assault, they argued, was the
integration of aircraft into an organizational division. Airmobility, on the other hand, they

9

Gary Roush, ―Helicopter Losses during the Vietnam War,‖ accessed June 4, 2011,
http://www.vhpa.org/heliloss.pdf.
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considered the capability of moving men and equipment by air. Tactics, techniques, and
procedures are simple terms intended to describe sometimes complicated functions or
concepts. In the following pages, they describe the manner in which assault helicopter
units executed missions, including formations, altitudes, landing zone approaches and
preparations, anti-aircraft defense measures, and various other methods common to
combat operations. This thesis does not laboriously enumerate the varied and complicated
aspects of these, because, in many ways it would be an impossible task. Helicopter units
devised so many unique procedures that collecting and presenting them by region and
time would be not only onerous to both compiler and reader, but also somewhat
valueless. Unless well-versed in the mechanics and execution of such tactics and
principles of helicopter warfare, the detail would largely obfuscate the overall argument –
that there actually was evolution and innovation throughout the Vietnam War, rather than
what those particular components might have been.
In sum, this study can illuminate what remains an overlooked and opaque
element of the Vietnam War. The evolution of assault helicopter tactics was not
necessarily something unique in warfare. Indeed, for an application of a new technology
to become effective there must be an era of refinement which combines lessons learned
from past experiences into a program of efficiency. When operations began in 1961,
Army pilots had no combat experience from which to derive a doctrinal approach to the
operations they were tasked with performing. Their initial experiences may have given
insight into the possibilities of the helicopter, but it fell upon those who came later to
redefine the limits of Army Aviation‘s capabilities. Each generation of American
helicopter pilots who have followed can trace their tactical lineage to Southeast Asia.
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Indeed, for the better part of almost two decades, the Vietnam War was the only major
basis of combat-tested knowledge from which the U.S. Army could derive combat
experience. Despite being a vibrant era for helicopter advancements, the Vietnam War
was only the first chapter – the densest chapter – in what remains an evolving narrative
still today.

CHAPTER 1: THE EARLY YEARS

Army Aviation experienced a hectic decade before they began operations in
Southeast Asia. They did not arrive as a force with explicit combat-proven doctrine.
What they did benefit from before large-scale employment of assault helicopters,
however, were important moments of action and thought. Their journey began with small
steps. Pre-Vietnam rivalry steeled the nascent organization, as their use of helicopters
was experimental and even controversial, causing interservice friction. In the early Cold
War milieu of deterrence and potential nuclear war they struggled to legitimize their
proposed role. Though helicopters were not the central component of a revised strategy,
visionary members inside the Army and the government championed a military more
dependent upon the aircraft. Airmobility evolved significantly during this short time, and
helicopters found new relevance in an unlikely environment. Military planners altered
their focus from the main contingency of a war against the Eastern Bloc to a growing
insurgency in Vietnam. Army Aviation transitioned to meet the guerilla threat while
simultaneously testing stateside the revolutionary concept of an airmobile division.
Antiquated equipment, constricting command relationships, and lack of concrete doctrine
hampered early wartime efforts. However, experience gained in both Vietnam and the
United States assisted in improving future capabilities. The airmobile division‘s first
battle in 1965 was the culmination of year‘s worth of theorizing and training, but only the
initial evaluation of large-scale helicopter warfare.
13
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Early Proponents
Army Major General James M. Gavin was one of the earliest influential
proponents of airmobility. Already known for his innovative spirit and visionary outlook
while commanding the 82nd Airborne Division during World War II, his April 1954
Harper’s magazine article signals the beginning of an embryonic debate. The aptly titled
―Cavalry, and I Don‘t Mean Horses‖ proposed that helicopters offered increased
―momentum.‖ Arguing that the nuclear age necessitated highly mobile forces dispersed
over vast terrain, Gavin suggested a combined armor and air cavalry. With an image of
the European battlefield in mind, he asserted that ―in ground combat the mobility
differential we lack will be found in the air vehicle.‖10
Throughout the 1950s, the incipient airmobility concept began to gain support
among influential proponents within the Army. The helicopter‘s combat usefulness had
become apparent during the Korean War (1950-1953), when they used modest numbers
of them to fly logistical missions or as medical evacuation vehicles. The United States
Marine Corps (USMC), not the Army, was the first branch to use successfully helicopters
in combat situations as became common practice in Vietnam. Throughout the Korean
War, Marines experimented with rotary-wing aircraft to supply and transport infantry,
capably relocating entire battalions.11 Upon witnessing the utility of USMC helicopters,
Army General Matthew Ridgway, acting as Commanding General of Far East Command,
suggested in 1951 that the Department of Defense create up to four transportation

10

Richard P. Weinert, Historical Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and
Reserve Forces, US Continental Army Command. A History of Army Aviation – 1950-1962, Phase I:
1950-1954 (Fort Monroe, Virginia, June 1971), 181.
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Marine Corps History Division, 2003), 61.
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helicopter battalions for the Army.12 Though his recommendation was reduced to two
companies, the request indicates the growing significance of the aircraft to forwardthinking individuals.
In August 1954 the Army took further steps to develop their own organic aviation
capabilities, reactivating the once defunct Camp Rucker for use as the Army Aviation
School. In October 1955 aviation found a permanent home there, re-designated Fort
Rucker.13 Given President Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s policy of massive retaliation, though,
the Army struggled to explain their legitimacy in an era where military action would be
dominated by their service cousins‘ high-flying strategic bombers.14 United States Air
Force (USAF) staff officers hinted that the only usefulness of traditional Army infantry in
the nuclear age would be to act as security forces for missile and bomber bases. With
budgetary restrictions from Eisenhower‘s ―New Look,‖ military planners clamored to
prove they were still relevant. The Navy, USAF, and USMC all made efforts to
implement helicopters in their operations. Compared to the Army, though, others had to
maintain extensive and expensive fixed-wing units simultaneously, detracting from their
budgets and willingness to implement rotary-wing aircraft in a large scale.
The Army, however, saw the opportunity to utilize the burgeoning technology and
marry it with a reworked strategy. In this milieu, their strategists adapted helicopters from
12
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a limited role to an important tactical machine. Mobility, the era‘s buzz word in the
military community, became the focus when anticipating Soviet armor storming across
the plains of Europe. A larger battlefield due to the range and lethality of nuclear
weapons meant conventional ground transportation would prove too slow and vulnerable.
For that reason, planners believed helicopters necessary to quickly insert troops and
supplies where needed. They understood the future battlefield to be one ―characterized by
fluid operations of units dispersed under the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons.‖15
Wishing to enhance infantry mobility, they hoped to ―break free of the ground barrier,‖
doing so by turning ―to Army Aviation and the airspace just above the earth‘s surface as a
partial answer to its needs.‖16 Realizing that nuclear weapons altered how armies would
fight future wars, Army Chief of Staff Ridgway and his staff determined that helicopters
would have to provide transportation, evacuation, supply, and communications – all roles
the helicopter filled in Vietnam.
Interservice Rivalry
The Army‘s desire to expand their aircraft inventory soon ran them afoul of the
Air Force, however. This was the result of a crisis of identity between the two branches.
As political scientist Frederic Bergerson explains, the Air Force wished to protect their
role as the dominant practitioners of flight in the U.S. military. The Army existed as the
―defender of the terrain,‖ and as Bergerson argues, ―their style reflected the vicissitudes
of natural forces – cautious, slow, close to the ground.‖17 Conversely, the USAF role was
as defenders of the air, and in ―such an ethereal atmosphere, it is not surprising that these
15
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men clung tenaciously to the tangible air vehicles which took them and their identity
aloft.‖18 Leaving aside the metaphysical, though, the very real purpose of the Air Force‘s
aversion towards an expanded Army air capability is that they felt it encroached upon
their function – if it flew it should belong to the Air Force. An agreement existed, though,
originating from the National Security Act of 1947 which in part created the USAF,
allowing the Army to possess organic aircraft. Despite such an accommodation, there
were limitations to expansion. The Key West Agreement of 1948 between the Navy,
Army, and the fledgling Air Force permitted the Army to retain limited aviation
capabilities, but made no allowances for aircraft employed tactically as planners came to
envision their role. Instead, the Air Force was to ―furnish close combat and logistical air
support to the Army,‖ which included air lift, support, reconnaissance, and resupply
operations – all functions the Army eventually sought to handle themselves.19 Likewise,
the 20 May 1949 Bradley-Vandenberg Agreement intended to arrest further the numbers
of aircraft by instituting weight restrictions on Army helicopters.20
Both branches acquiesced regarding further conditions in a 1950 agreement,
stipulating the USAF would solely develop, supply, and conduct maintenance on Army
aircraft.21 In a bid to guarantee weakened Army Aviation, the Air Force attempted to
usurp their usefulness by proposing their own assault helicopter squadrons.22 Air Force
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obstructions throughout the 1950s and well into the 1960s did slow advances in Army
airmobility, but Air Staff members understood that to continue their preclusions and
simultaneously maintain their future ambitions required a trade-off. Ultimately, as a
means to maintain their primary role in massive retaliation, plans for their own assault
helicopter squadrons lost out to the high-technology appeal of strategic nuclear
delivery.23
During this era the Army lacked a single policy regarding the development of
helicopter doctrine, resulting in multiple studies which acted independently without
assisting or informing each other. The latter 1950s, however, witnessed a more focused
attempt at establishing a singular program.24 The creation of a helicopter force was aided
by the growing realization among policy makers that although nuclear war remained a
distinct possibility and still prevailed as the central focus of American foreign policy,
limited war was a growing potentiality.25 The 1958 Lebanon intervention and the
Quemoy crisis indicated that massive retaliation offered few alternatives to total war, no
matter the insignificance of the provocation.26 Reorganization among the Army occurred
in 1961 to reflect this understanding.27 Under the new framework, division aviation assets
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grew from company-size to battalion, a structure which the Army carried into Vietnam.
As historian Christopher Cheng notes, however, while ―these new developments in Army
aviation were significant, it was still a relatively evolutionary step . . . [the]
reorganization did not create any major air mobile force.‖28 Even though the numbers of
helicopters grew, for the most part units acted autonomously, without any official dictates
of how they fit into a programmed combat structure. It took American intervention in
Southeast Asia before airmobility took that next crucial step.
Rotors over Vietnam
The first U.S. helicopters arrived in Vietnam aboard the USNS Core on 11
December 1961.29 The 57th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) and the 8th
Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) participated in the earliest airmobile
operation of the war on 2 January 1962 when Army CH-21 Shawnees successfully
airlifted 1,000 Republic of Vietnam (RVN) paratroopers against a Viet Cong
headquarters near Saigon.30 Codenamed ―Operation Chopper,‖ it signified the first phase
of airmobile operations and the start of a decade-long proving ground for Army Aviation.
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According to General Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Adviser to President Kennedy,
Vietnam was a suitable location for helicopters to operate. A lack of passable roads for
ground mobile units or adequate communication lines hindered the RVN government‘s
ability to fight communist incursions into the hinterland. U.S. aircraft promised to give
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) quick response to the enemy‘s guerilla
operations and to expand governmental control in the provinces. Furthermore, helicopters
offered a degree of safety – they could overfly much of what was becoming dangerous
territory, since ground routes were often susceptible not only to ambushes, but mines.
Initially, thirty-two CH-21 Shawnees from the 57th and the 8th operated out of Tan Son
Nhut Air Base near Saigon.31 Three more companies augmented them that year: the 33rd,
81st, and 93rd of the 45th Transportation Battalion. In an illustration of America‘s level of
commitment at this early stage, the 130 aircraft comprised almost twenty percent of the
Army‘s available inventory.32
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Early Problems
This period, however, was fraught with multiple problems. First, the relatively
limited number of aircraft and pilots meant they were not able to experiment much
beyond the normal demands of missions.34 Opportunities for gaining experience were
limited to when the ARVN needed support, but even then command problems limited
flexibility. American involvement was still technically an advisory effort. Transportation
companies operated on a single-mission basis, attached to U.S. advisers who controlled
mission planning and coordination. These advisers, however, had finite authority. Given
their limited role they could not necessarily order the South Vietnamese to operate in a
particular way, but merely suggest the best course of action.
33
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Early missions were often uncoordinated efforts between aviators and those they
supported, depriving helicopter units of control.35 Crews found that unclear command
relationships required alterations in command and control, communications, and fire
support methods. Concern over this policy was not confined to pilots and crews but those
in the United States questioned it, too. Retired Army Brigadier General Carl Hutton,
himself an early helicopter proponent and former Commandant of the Army Aviation
School, expressed hesitation, saying ―The divided command in Vietnam doubly weakens
the tactics. In spite of the superb skill and steadfast courage of the helicopter personnel,
the method of employment almost assures ultimate failure of national policy.‖36
Compounding matters, transportation companies experienced problems with their
equipment. From the start there were precious few CH-21s available and replacement
parts were considerably difficult to obtain, a fact exacerbated by insufficient logistical
support.37 The Shawnee itself was sometimes problematic in the face of enemy fire, often
proving too slow, too lightly armed, and too thin-skinned.38 Technological innovations
had not kept pace with modern requirements, as the issue of antiquated equipment was
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emblematic of an army in transition. The Bell UH-1 Iroquois ―Huey‖, the most
recognizable helicopter of the war, began testing in 1956 but did not arrive in Vietnam
until September 1962.39 When it did begin operations, lack of performance forced
technical revisions, leading to the replacement of the original HU-1A with the UH-1Bmodel by June 1963. Its stronger power plant was better suited for the high humidity,
altitude density, and demanding operations.40 The Army was preparing to replace their
aging aircraft, but the next generation of turbine-powered helicopters lingered stateside in
the comprehensive testing phase.41
Obsolescent Shawnees were cause for concern amongst many who flew them.
Noted New York Times journalist, David Halberstam, reported that most were ―in
desperate need of repairs and that the difficult and demanding combat conditions in
Vietnam‖ caused immense mechanical issues.42 ―The H-21 here,‖ warned one pilot, ―is
an accident looking for a place to happen.‖43 Simply put, the first year of operations
coincided with a transition period where better aircraft in the development stage since the
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late 1950s were not yet available in appreciable numbers for combat. Despite these
issues, Army Aviation still made progress improving airmobile doctrine. In less than a
year of operating in RVN, as one correspondent saw it, they had learned ―more
substantial information upon their new ‗air-assault‘ concept than had been gathered in
years of earlier theorizing.‖44
The helicopter companies in-country were indeed learning valuable lessons which
only combat could provide, and much of what they gathered was the product of continued
trial and error. Soon after operations began, crews quickly realized deficiencies in their
standard operating procedures. Peacetime formations were often ill-suited for the combat
theater. As one former pilot noted, they ―looked nice and displayed our superior skills,
but reduced the scope of defensive fire and did not place the troops on the ground in
optimum arrangements for attack or defense.‖45 Just as problematic were flight altitudes
customarily used stateside, which most times exposed flights needlessly to enemy fire.
Most of what these first helicopter units developed were aggressive tactics far removed
from earlier methods.46 Commenting on the casualties in men and machine by early 1963,
an unnamed ―high-ranking military spokesman‖ remarked, ―Remember, this kind of
warfare is brand new. We have to do some experimenting and we‘re bound to make
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mistakes. But let‘s not forget how much helicopters have accomplished here.‖47 Vietnam
quickly took on the character for which it became known. As one CH-21 crewmember
observed, the Army‘s struggle was ―mainly a helicopter war. The helicopters are the
front-line weapon.‖48
Through the experience of assisting ARVN forces, helicopter units drew lessons
which proved invaluable not only to future operations in Vietnam, but to airmobility
planners in the United States. Yet, to date Army Aviation was still engaged in a new type
of warfare without official guidelines for operational planning and execution. Their
tactics and procedures were largely ad hoc and not reflective of a sophisticated combined
arms effort. Though their accomplishments are important, parallel developments in the
United States during the same time proved to have more impactful consequences on the
future of airmobility.
Stateside Developments
While helicopter units flew daily operations in Vietnam, Army officials in the
United States continued planning for a larger airmobile force. Throughout the early
1960s, they began a series of reviews and boards to determine not only the future needs
of aviation units, but how they would fight. The first official committee which studied the
requirements was the Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board. Chaired by Lieutenant
General Gordon B. Rogers, the deputy commanding general of the Continental Army
Command, the Rogers Board reviewed potential aircraft with future combat needs in
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mind.49 Beginning on 15 January 1960 it analyzed 119 designs from forty five separate
companies, categorizing them into transport, observation, and surveillance. Among the
notable recommendations was that the Army replace ―each model of aircraft at least
every ten years or sooner if warranted by operational requirements or technological
advances,‖ and that they ―prepare an in-depth study to determine whether the concept of
air assault units was practical and if an experimental unit should be activated to test its
feasibility.‖50 Though the Rogers Board did indicate progress in the Army‘s evolving use
of helicopters, it was only a precursor of the tests to follow.
In an April 1962 memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara outlined his tacit support of helicopters, noting ―It appears
to me that air vehicles, operating in the environment of the ground solider but freed from
the restrictions imposed by the earth‘s surface, may offer the opportunity to acquire
quantum increases in mobility, provided technology, doctrine, and organization potentials
are fully exploited.‖51 In other correspondence he argued that the success of tests ―already
made by the Army of airmobile divisions and their subordinate airmobile units . . .
indicate the type of doctrinal concepts which could be evolved . . . .‖52 The Kennedy
administration‘s support encouraged atypical perspectives on future warfare. In the
secretary‘s opinion, he believed ―that the Army‘s re-examination of its aviation
49
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requirements should be a bold ‗new look‘ at land warfare mobility. It should be
conducted in an atmosphere divorced from traditional viewpoints and past policies.‖53
McNamara‘s encouragement came with a warning, as he cautioned he would ―be
disappointed if the Army‘s re-examination merely produces logistic-oriented
recommendations to procure more of the same, rather than a plan for implementing fresh
and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility.‖54
It was a license for Army Aviation to adopt the recommendations of its most ardent
defenders of helicopters, while also a heavy burden – there would be only four months to
gather personnel, devise and execute tests, and write a detailed report.55 Quickly, the
Army formed a group to conduct the tests of airmobility, headed by Major General
Hamilton H. Howze, the man hand-chosen by McNamara.56
The resultant committee, the Howze Board, was perhaps the single most
important development of the 1960s in regards to establishing and suggesting the
formation and operation of airmobile units.57 Howze took over as the chair, charged with
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testing the organizational and operational concepts of airmobility. Thirteen generals, a
handful of civilian researchers, and thirty staff officers fell under his direct command.
Divided into seven separate working committees, each studied either reconnaissance,
security, and target acquisition, tactical mobility, fire power, logistics operations and
logistics support, operations research, and field testing.58 The Board wrote to active and
retired officers, sending over 400 letters inquiring about their level of interest and
suggestions for airmobility. The majority of the responses indicated a marked level of
support for the concept, and the massive amount of correspondence served as an
unofficial library of suggestions and ideas.59
Howze submitted the final report to McNamara in August 1962, which concluded
that full adoption of the concept seemed prudent.60 In the Board‘s estimation airmobility
was both ―necessary and desirable‖ – an inevitable evolution no different than the
replacement of animal mobility by motor.61 Though the American commitment in
Southeast Asia was increasing, the central focus of airmobility was not solely on its
application in Vietnam. The final report outlined four potential enemy forces against
which a proposed airmobile division could possibly fight and should thus be evaluated
for such eventualities: ―a modern enemy army (Warsaw Pact), an oriental army (Chinese
Communist), an insurgency (Viet Cong) and other threats (Latin America, Africa,
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etc.).‖62 These were still mostly theoretical distinctions, though. The Board provided the
framework for an airmobile division, but McNamara demanded further testing to develop
air assault techniques. For that, it required a special unit.
The 11th Air Assault Division and the 10th Air Transport Brigade
The formation of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) at Fort Benning, Georgia
might be the most significant recommendation of the Board – it certainly had the most
far-reaching consequences.63 Activated 15 February 1963 from the 11th Airborne
Division, its commander, Brigadier General Harry W.O. Kinnard, received orders to
―determine how far and how fast the Army can go, and should go, in embracing
airmobility.‖64 More to the point, the 11th‘s purpose was ―to develop the details of
doctrine, tactics and technique for its employment . . . [and] the chore of proving or
disproving or modifying the organization prescribed by the [Howze] Board.‖65 Kinnard
immediately allowed a free exchange of ideas, permitting his subordinate commanders to
voice their opinions on tactical and operational theories and proposed developments.
Unique to the test division was the ―Idea Center,‖ where ―any man, enlisted or officer,
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could come in with an idea and where that idea would receive full evaluation.‖66 The
spirit of the 11th Air Assault Division (11th AAD) was professional and the Idea Center
illustrated their singularity of purpose: to push the limits of helicopters and how the Army
used them.
As if those participating in the tests were not already aware of the impact their
labors might have on the future of helicopter warfare, Colonel George P. ―Phip‖ Seneff,
Jr., commander of the 11th AAD‘s 11th Aviation Group, attempted to make it apparent.
Within weeks of the unit‘s formation Seneff wrote his men. ―You all have excellent
backgrounds for your jobs,‖ he assured them, ―and you are chosen people. If you didn‘t
have the backgrounds in the first place, you wouldn‘t be here….‖67 In Seneff‘s
estimation, membership in the 11th came with a large degree of responsibility, as ―the
future of Army Aviation, and I think, a large part of the Army hangs on the outcome of
our efforts.‖68 Their endeavors went beyond testing, but would act as the main
determinant between either progress or a step back. ―If we are successful,‖ Seneff
predicted, ―the Air Mobile concept will be a dynamic advance for the Army. If we are
not, we will go back to flying Piper Cubs, if we have that much left, and the Army and
the country as a whole will lose one of the things that . . . can mean the difference
between victory and defeat in future land combat.‖69
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That is not to say everyone believed air assault was inevitable or that it was only a
matter of time before its full implementation. Army Chief of Staff General Earle G.
Wheeler stated in 1963 that ―we expect the 11th Air Assault test program . . . to be a fair,
unbiased, thoroughly professional examination of concepts, organization, and equipment
that appear to offer very great promise for increasing our Army‘s combat
effectiveness.‖70 Kinnard asserted that he did not approach the testing believing that
airmobility would fulfill a preordained outcome. His job as the 11th AAD‘s commander
was not to ―write success or failure on the 11th as it was given to me,‖ but instead to
―nurture and develop it – to come up with the best improvement on the Howze Board that
we could, given the resources and the time available.‖71 In later reflection, Lieutenant
General Robert E. Coffin, the Chief of Staff of the Air Assault testing, argued the tests
were objective and not all participants were certain airmobility would succeed. Instead,
they approached their tasks convinced that ―air assault was going to have to prove itself,‖
rather than merely confirming a supposed certainty. 72
Much of the doctrine with which the division experimented was directly related to
what aviators in Southeast Asia were learning on a daily basis: flying in formation, aerial
and artillery support in the multiple phases of air assaults, as well as the efficient
movement of men and supplies throughout the battlefield areas. By October 1962 the
Army had produced the first document to examine operational experiences of aviation
units in Vietnam, distributing it widely for commanders and staff officers to allow for
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doctrinal progression.73 That connection with the combat theater continued as the 11th
maintained contact with units already in-country, and from across an ocean
communicated between them many of their respective procedures and techniques.
Helping this flow of ideas were pilots who returned from tours in Vietnam and arrived at
Fort Benning to relate their experiences.74
The 11th spent the remainder of 1963 and into 1964 testing new equipment,
experimenting with maneuvers and organizations, executing simulated operations, and all
the while slowly gaining aircraft and personnel. The culminating field exercise was the
October 1964 Air Assault II, which ranged across four million acres in North and South
Carolina.75 The 82nd Airborne, augmented by two mechanized battalions of the 2nd
Infantry Division, acted as the opposing force, simulating both guerilla and conventional
forces. The 11th‘s command of the battlefield impressed most, as their increased mobility
freed them of the usual hampering effects of rough terrain.76 At the close of testing the
neutral test director, Fort Benning‘s Post Commander, Lieutenant General C.W.G. Rich,
submitted his glowing recommendation to Army Chief of Staff General Harold K.
Johnson, claiming that an air assault division constituted ―the most versatile forces that
we can add to the United States Army.‖77 Despite the mostly positive recommendations
of those involved with the tests, McNamara did not immediately approve the activation of

73

Cheng, Air Mobility, 187.

74

Combat Studies Institute, Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat, 30.

75

Carland, ―How We Got There,‖ 12.

76

Coleman, et al. The 1st Air Cavalry Division, 22; Carland, ―How We Got There,‖ 13.

77

As quoted in Carland, ―How We Got There,‖ 13. Rich also recommended that the units remain together
for more training, thinking additional testing was unnecessary. Merle Thomas Cole, ―11 th Air Assault
Division: Test Bed of the Airmobile Concept‖ (1977), USAMHI Library, 14.

33
an airmobile division. The worsening situation in Vietnam, however, acted as a
substantial catalyst.
As historian John Carland notes, the ARVN‘s quickly eroding ability to contain
the insurgency provided an impetus for the Department of Defense to accept an airmobile
division in the Army‘s organization structure.78 By early 1965 the Army had to decide
which unit would operate in northern RVN with its rugged terrain and the important
provincial capital of Pleiku. Reliance on ordinary infantry units seemed dubious given
their time-intensive movements and general over-dependence on vehicles. Following
such rigorous testing, and eager to prove themselves in battle, the 11th Air Assault
Division seemed a suitable fit. 79 After a dedicated effort to determine how effective the
new concept could be, those associated with the tests were anxious to implement it,
impatient to ―flex its muscles . . . eager to show off airmobility and make officials
wonder how they ever got along without it.‖80
Despite favorable recommendations to implement the airmobile division, Kinnard
was apprehensive that their efforts in the 11th AAD were for naught. He noted that ―It
was my overall impression [the airmobile division] was hanging by a thread, and I was
very worried about it.‖81 It was Vietnam, though, in Kinnard‘s later reflections, which
convinced the command structure to implement an airmobile division. ―I think it was a
very tight time,‖ he mentioned, and ―I would have to speculate that if there had been no
decision to send a division to Vietnam – an Army division—that we probably would have
78

Carland, ―How We Got There,‖ 14.

79

Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Why, ―The Evolution of Fire Support Doctrine Was Driven By Airmobile
Doctrine and New Weapons Systems during the Vietnam War,‖ (Master‘s Thesis), U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College, 2004), 37.
80
81

1st Cav Interim Report of Operations, July 1, 1965-December 31, 1966, 3.
As quoted in Carland, ―How We Got There,‖ 14.

34
been broken up and probably there would not have been an airmobile or an air assault
division.‖82 Kinnard‘s speculations are likely correct. Throughout the testing phase the
United States inched closer to outright war, and that eventuality helped keep the air
assault division alive.
The Tonkin Gulf incident in early August 1964 involving two U.S. destroyers, the
Maddox and Turner Joy, provided President Lyndon Johnson with a growing conviction
that the situation demanded an enhanced American military presence.83 From late 1964
into mid-1965 American troops in Vietnam grew from fifty thousand to ninety thousand.
Meanwhile, the moribund RVN government struggled against the communist insurgency.
Into this climate of growing uncertainty and continued instability the airmobility concept
evolved from a testable theory to reality. Southeast Asia was soon to be its proving
ground, as the Central Highlands and the provincial capitals of Kontum and Pleiku
continued to be a high profile target for the Viet Cong. Secretary McNamara accepted the
proposal to create an airmobile division on 19 April 1965. It took until 15 June, though,
before he formally approved the decision to activate the 11th, reflagging the unit as the 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile).84 President Johnson announced in July that he was sending
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one hundred thousand more U.S. troops to South Vietnam, specifically naming the 1st
Cav as the first to deploy – Vietnam had birthed the airmobile division.
In order to fill the ranks, pilots from all over the Army received orders to Fort
Benning.85 The new unit had only eight weeks to become combat-ready. Recently arrived
aviators received training from 11th AAD veterans to impart upon them the new tactical
concepts and procedures the testing unit had devised.86 Fresh from the Army‘s rotarywing aviation school, Robert Mason experienced the capabilities of 11th AAD‘s pilots.
Compared to his training during flight school where ―our formations could be defined as
two or more helicopters flying within sight of each other in the same sky‖ the close
formations employed by the ―old salts‖ demanded far more aptitude. To squeeze a flight
of Hueys into small landing zones ―required that they fly, land, and take off very close
together.‖87 To be sure, most of the former members of the 11th maintained an extreme
level of proficiency, exemplifying their status as fearless wild men. Their flying fit the
model, too, as Mason asserts, ―These guys were cowboys.‖88
Despite attempts to acclimate new pilots to the distinct methods of flying, there
would not be enough time to fully prepare. As Mason notes, ―I saw these techniques – the
low-level, the close formations – performed much more often than I did them. We had
very little time. The new pilots would be getting their Huey experience and air-assault
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training on the job in Vietnam.‖89 Indeed, veteran of the 11th Air Assault Division or not,
most all were equally inexperienced in the real application of airmobility in a theater of
war, though that day fast approached. Kinnard left for Southeast Asia on 16 August to
meet with the overall commander of the American effort there, General William C.
Westmoreland of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).90 How the 1st
Cavalry would fare in combat, however, remained to be seen.
The Guns of November: The Pleiku Campaign and Airmobility
The first group to represent the 1st Cavalry, the Advance Liaison Detachment, left
the continental U.S. on 2 August 1965. Illustrating the intimate relation between aviation
and the airmobile unit, twenty eight of the ―key officers and men‖ were pilots. The
majority were executive officers ordered to liaise with aviation units already in Vietnam,
learning aspects of operating in the unique terrain and weather conditions they would
encounter in their area of operations.91 Upon meeting with the initial group two miles
north of the village of An Khe, thirty six miles inland, they began construction of the 1st
Cavalry‘s new home, effectively in the middle of Viet Cong-controlled territory.92
The 1st Cavalry Division‘s arrival in Vietnam marks the second phase of
airmobile operations in Southeast Asia. With more assets and a dedicated division of
soldiers trained for the new type of combat, it did not take long for the Americans to
baptize in fire their refined concept. North Vietnamese forces attacked the small,
triangular-shaped Special Forces compound at Plei Me near the Cambodian border on 19
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October, signaling phase one of the larger Pleiku Campaign/Operation Silver Bayonet.
An assault on such a remote outpost was not a peculiar incident for the period. It differed
from other attacks not only because of the noticeable ferocity with which they struck, but
the fact it was so well planned and executed. Indeed, the attackers were not the customary
local Viet Cong soldiers – farmers by day and militia by night – but a regiment of wellprepared and equipped North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars hoping to lure and
ambush any relief element.93
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The fierceness of the assault worried Westmoreland. It appeared the NVA would
strike other important locations, like the provincial capital of Pleiku City. Worse yet, they
might cut South Vietnam in two.95 It soon became evident that Plei Me was the start of a
concerted enemy effort to gain control of the whole Central Highlands.96 When
Westmoreland arrived on 26 September the situation remained worrisome. Intelligence
suggested a portion of the NVA forces were regrouping west of Plei Me in a 2,500 square
kilometer region of rolling terrain punctuated by elephant grass and wooded areas.97
Airmobile units appeared best suited to engage the enemy in the largely road-less area,
especially against such a conventionally equipped and trained main force opponent.
Westmoreland‘s orders were simple: ―Find, fix and destroy the enemy forces threatening
Plei Me, Pleiku, and the Central Highlands.‖98
Sturm and Ia Drang
American forces caught up with the North Vietnamese in the Ia Drang Valley,
approximately six miles from the Cambodian border.99 In the shadow of the Chu Pong
massif, 11th Air Assault veteran Colonel Harold G. Moore and his 1st Battalion, 7th
Cavalry Regiment (1/7), 1st Cavalry Division, air assaulted, setting the stage for the first
large-scale meeting of U.S. and NVA forces. Earlier in the day of 14 November, Moore
executed a reconnaissance flight to locate prospective landing zones. Employing tactical
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deception, he was careful to not directly overfly the area, lest they telegraph American
intentions to any enemy observing from below – a technique which became standard
throughout most of Vietnam.100 Instead, Moore had his flight of two lift ships and their
two escorting gunships fly a straight line towards Duc Co Special Forces camp, well
southeast of the Chu Pong and at an altitude of 4,500 feet. After reviewing three possible
landing zones, Moore and his subordinates agreed upon one, code-named Landing Zone
(LZ) X-Ray.101
As the sixteen Hueys of the 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB) formed up
and prepared to insert the first lift into X-Ray they exercised the tactics of a typical
combat assault as dictated by the Army‘s previous experience in Vietnam and the 11th Air
Assault‘s testing. Moore arranged for preparatory artillery fires on the landing zone to
begin twenty minutes before their scheduled arrival.102 The flight maintained an altitude
of 2,000 feet to stay outside the effective range of small arms fire, as they were crossing
almost fifteen miles of countryside controlled entirely by the enemy. The 14.3 miles
between where the rest of the battalion staged at Plei Me for insertion into the Ia Drang
meant a lengthy round-trip and multiple lifts.
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The first three flights of ―slicks‖ landed in LZ X-Ray, attaining surprise, but as
the third lift departed the enemy began to pour down the Chu Pong and attack the landing
zone.103 Stiff resistance meant the 229th‘s pilots could not deliver all of the unit‘s
remaining troops. Facing a difficult situation and dwindling supplies, without the
helicopter support it is doubtful the besieged 1st Battalion could have fought on, as they
found themselves immediately surrounded by an opposing force many times their size,
equaling at least a regiment.104 Understanding the importance of the landing zone,
Colonel Moore directed his troopers to protect it at all costs. ―That football-field-size
clearing,‖ Moore later wrote,‖ was our lifeline and our supply line. If the enemy closed
the way to the helicopters all of us would die in this place.‖105 Throughout the
engagement the 229th flew crucial medical evacuation and resupply missions into X-Ray,
―in most cases at grave risk to pilots and crew.‖106 By 16 November, two days after
fighting began, Hal Moore‘s battalion received orders to withdraw from the area while
elements of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry and 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry would take
over.107
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The assault helicopter pilots did not necessarily exhibit any groundbreaking
tactics unique to the Ia Drang Valley battle; they merely exercised the techniques
practiced and drilled repeatedly during the testing phase and subsequent training periods
in the continental U.S.108 What is significant, though, is that for the first time they
supported American soldiers from start to finish against main-force North Vietnamese
regulars in what was the largest and bloodiest engagement of the war to date. The 1st
Cavalry took full advantage of their aviation assets. UH-1s carried them into battle, CH47s relocated supporting artillery batteries numerous times, scout helicopters acted as the
eyes of the larger unit, command and control ships (C&C) coordinated the battle from the
air, while gunship and aerial rocket artillery (ARA) helicopters offered close air
support.109
The battle was a victory, but not a resounding one for the Americans in a
conventional sense. Certainly their ground troops could claim success in that they
pursued their enemy, won the battlefield and forced a heavy toll in men and equipment,
but the cost in American lives was nonetheless shocking.110 For the most part, though, the
Americans were victorious – the 1st Cavalry‘s intention was to find, fix, and destroy the
108
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enemy, not gain and hold terrain. While success in the Ia Drang can be measured in a
comparative body count and the fact the enemy retreated back across the border into
Cambodia, the ultimate gauge of triumph for most in the Army was how the 1st Cavalry
transformed the theoretical into conceptual reality. Strategically, the larger Pleiku
Campaign upset NVA aims in the Central Highlands.
In a larger sense, though, it proved the effectiveness of large-scale airmobile
efforts and the invaluable mobility of helicopters. Plei Me and the resultant battle at Ia
Drang were what the operations report termed ―airmobility‘s acid test,‖ which revealed
―whether three years of planning and testing would bear the fruits of victory – for a
concept and a division.‖111 To Westmoreland, the substantiation of heli-borne warfare
was notable in the absence of battlefield errors which had accompanied other first-actions
in the American military record. He admitted that although a single U.S. casualty was
lamentable, he ―could take comfort in the fact that in the Highlands . . . the American
fighting man and his commanders had performed without the setbacks that have
sometimes marked first performance in other wars.‖112 Indeed, Ia Drang avoided the
devastating initial engagement stumble of the Kasserine Pass or Pusan Perimeter. For
those expecting a promising debut for American troops in South Vietnam, the Pleiku
Campaign seemed to offer it.
Perhaps the professionalism which the 1st Cavalry‘s helicopter battalions
exhibited during their first large combat action is not surprising. The pilots did not arrive
in Vietnam completely unprepared. Rigorous stateside training by the 11th Air Assault
had at least prepared most with an in-depth knowledge of the mechanics of air assaults.
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Chief Warrant Officer Leland C. Komich credits his time in the 11th with helping him
cope with the initial shock of combat. ―The training carried over to Vietnam very nicely,‖
he remembered. ―The first time I was in a ‗hot‘ landing zone, I heard everybody shooting
but thought, ‗Jeez, that‘s the same sound you get in training with blanks.‘‖113 In his afteraction report, Colonel Moore professed his opinion of Army aviators during Ia Drang and
maintained he had ―the highest admiration, praise and respect for the outstanding
professionalism and courage of the UH-1D pilots and crews who ran a gauntlet of enemy
fire time after time to help us. They never refused to come in; they followed instructions
beautifully; they were great.‖114 Indeed, the tactics and procedures learned earlier in the
war and refined during the tests in the American south had prepared the pilots and
commanders well.
Secretary of Defense McNamara visited the 1st Cavalry at An Khe soon after the
completion of the campaign and stated that the effort was an ―unparalleled achievement,‖
and promised that there would be ―more air cavalry divisions.‖115 It was a statement
intended to praise the 1st Cavalry for an impressive first engagement, perhaps indicative
of the relief he felt in that the concept actually worked, but his approbation did not reflect
the eventuality.116 Westmoreland also expressed relief at the engagement‘s outcome,
reporting that he had reservations about sending the unproven 1st Cavalry into
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―inhospitable terrain‖ and did so ―not without considerable anguish‖ – failure ―in our first
big test‖ would surely ―have sharp repercussions on our self-confidence and morale and
on the American people.‖117 For individuals so invested in airmobility‘s success, the
results of the Pleiku Campaign and Ia Drang mollified anxieties. The collective vision of
a more mobile force was not a dangerous gamble after all, but an effective reality.
Conclusion
Over the course of a quick fifteen years, Army combat helicopter units evolved
from a small contingent into a formidable force. With the foresight of a handful of
visionaries, helicopters became not only the prime mover of U.S. men and material
throughout Southeast Asia, but an invaluable component of an entire strategy. Though
explicitly intended for a European battlefield, wartime necessities meant airmobility
would find its true test in very different terrain against a very different enemy. Despite
there being some indication, especially in the early 1960s, that the United States might
soon face the challenge of brush-fire wars throughout the world, it did not necessarily
alter the Army‘s overall approach. Airmobility was not designed for Vietnam
specifically, but for a worldwide structure which stressed employment in Europe as the
most likely battlefield. So long as they provided mobility to their ground units, the Army
believed, they could meet any contingency in the world with a single organizational
structure.118
Since Vietnam seemed to require enhanced mobility it made sense helicopters met
their first tests in late 1961. For the Army, combating an insurgency with a new doctrine
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meant that, as historian Christopher Cheng posits, ―battlefield needs ultimately affected
the direction of air mobility development.‖119 If not for the initial years when undersupported units flying antiquated aircraft yielded impressive results, it is hard to imagine
Vietnam earning the eventual moniker of ―the helicopter war.‖ Recognition of just how
much combat the first units witnessed is not sufficiently appreciated in the historical
record.120 U.S. attempts to insist their presence was limited to advising has, perhaps,
caused an illusion that Army forces gained little knowledge of combat operations during
those formative years. To claim that it was simply an advisory effort with little actual
contact is to undervalue the era – even at the early stage it was a hot war, to be sure.
Despite their experiences, though, airmobility was not set in stone. The Howze
Board and the stateside tests throughout 1963 and 1964 by the 11th Air Assault Division
are often identified by scholars as the largest arbiter of airmobile tactics during the 1960s.
Though those actions certainly built the framework for how assault helicopters would be
utilized by the Army in Vietnam, they existed in the theoretical, untested in actual
combat. In the words of George Seneff, ―It was an exciting time, the 11th brought things a
long way. Vietnam brought them a lot further.‖121 The 1st Cavalry Division proved the
concept was valid, but units still had much to learn about the employment of helicopters.
Following victory in the Ia Drang, the tactical realities of some units changed.
The mission of the 1st Cavalry and helicopter units as a whole went from one of
reinforcement and reaction to one which permitted an almost endless and unlimited
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offensive.122 In the next few years American ground commanders utilized this capability,
depending on it to support a burgeoning strategy of attrition. Battlefield successes
signified maturation of the air assault concept and for most erased the belief the
helicopter‘s role lay mainly with the movement of equipment. Indeed, the concept was
proven effectual and worth further refinement. Pleiku may have been airmobility‘s first
test in large-scale combat, but it was far from the last. Throughout the remainder of
Vietnam, the Army continued to refine what Pleiku initially taught them: that the concept
was sound but far from infallible. Tactical revelations might have lauded the Pleiku
Campaign/Operation Silver Bayonet as the guarantor of helicopter assaults‘ battlefield
primacy, but the Army‘s desire to refine the concept assured it was only the beginning.
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CHAPTER TWO: INNOVATION THROUGH COMBAT EXPERIENCE
Throughout the remainder of the American involvement in Southeast Asia,
multiple factors affected how the Army refined their helicopter techniques and
procedures. There were four which noticeably influenced these doctrinal developments.
First was the character of the Vietnam War itself. Despite previous testing which
emphasized operating in a European conflict, the Army adapted helicopters as a
counterinsurgency tool. That shift required alterations in procedures, tactics, training, and
organization. Second, their employment on such a large scale required the Army to come
to terms with such prevalent usage. Both the aviation and infantry communities learned to
interact with one another, and helicopter crews discovered they had to ―educate‖ some
among the ground forces about aircraft, crew, or mission limitations. The third factor was
that the Army discovered that standardization of tactics and techniques across all of
South Vietnam was, although desirable on an organizational level, ultimately not feasible.
Geography, mission, and standard procedures among the supported ground units dictated
much of their techniques and methods. Finally, the enemy‘s ability to revise their own
methods required commensurate responses from assault helicopter units. Overall,
between 1966 and 1971 assault helicopters continued a vibrant era of innovation in
tactics, procedures, and mission.
1966: Coming of Age
One of the most significant factors to affect Army Aviation doctrine after 1965
was the character of the war. The U.S. military‘s overall strategy of attrition largely
47
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dictated how helicopter units operated. Additionally, the Americans struggled to counter
their opposition‘s reworked strategy, which was in part a direct response to the enhanced
mobility of U.S. helicopters. Army Aviation faced the reality that in order to remain a
viable resource they had to provide their assets in whatever way complemented the
infantry. This was certainly apparent in the aftermath of the Pleiku Campaign. As U.S.
and Communist forces solidified their strategies, the helicopter remained influential for
both. Indeed, if Ia Drang provided the Army comfort in validating airmobility, it had an
equally viable impact for the North Vietnamese Army.
Use of main force units signified an altered strategy for the NVA, as they moved
from guerilla operations into a conventional military unit configuration.123 Ia Drang
indicated to the North Vietnamese the structure of American operations. Infantry Colonel
David H. Hackworth concludes well that as a result, "the North Vietnamese learned how
to fight us. And looked at in this way, even if the battle was an unprecedented victory for
the Americans in our war of attrition, it was an equally unprecedented victory for our
enemy in their protracted guerrilla war.‖124 1966 was a transition year for both
belligerents. As the Communists learned American strengths, U.S. forces took steps
towards an offensive, building up the requisite amount of men and equipment to fight the
aggressive war which General William Westmoreland envisioned. In his words it became
a year of ―progressively developing our ability to fight an elusive enemy….a year of
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learning: old tactics had to be modified, new tactics and techniques explored. We had to
learn the enemy‘s tactics and how to deal with them….‖125
While the enemy still maintained their large conventional forces, they were
careful to operate mostly in the safety of border areas, notable for their remoteness, and
along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) or heavily forested and jungled regions.
Westmoreland noted that throughout 1966 the NVA remained in isolated environs,
unable to ―bring their weight to bear in the populated areas‖; a belief he substantiated
with the fact that ―no main force unit . . . entered the populated area around Saigon‖ for
over fifteen months.‖126 Realizing that open battle on anything but their own terms would
lead to unsustainable casualties, communist forces remained elusive. By allowing their
regular units to operate in the hinterland of Vietnam‘s western border, they hoped it
would draw the Americans out of the peopled areas, permitting the insurgency to make
gains in the more populated coastal regions.127
Frustrated by an increasingly evasive foe, the Army sought to engage them using
the mobility of helicopters. Much like the Pleiku Campaign, a substantial impediment to
American operations was rough terrain, mostly impassable using wheeled vehicles.
Overcoming these difficulties required troop-carrying helicopters. Apparent success in
late-1965 convinced the MACV staff in 1966 they now faced a weakened foe, and by
conventional thinking it constituted the perfect time to capitalize on any hesitation the
opposition offered.
125

Ibid., 120.

126

Ibid., 115.

127

George L. MacGarrigle, Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967
(Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1998), 11; General William C.
Westmoreland, ―Military War of Attrition,‖ in The Lessons of Vietnam, eds. W. Scott Thompson &
Donaldson D. Frizzell (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977), 65.

50
Westmoreland decided that large-scale offensive operations in South Vietnam
were the best avenue to victory. It aligned well with his strategy of wearing down the
enemy through high casualties. Doing so meant finding the opposition in remote areas of
the country, only easily accessible by air. Helicopters, therefore, became an essential
vehicle of the American strategy. Of the several strategic choices available, an offensive
against North Vietnam proper could potentially bring an end to the war. That would
likely conflict with the U.S. policy of containment, though, and some strategists feared it
could provoke a possible intervention by Communist Chinese forces. Cross-border
thrusts into the sanctuary zones of neutral Laos and Cambodia – areas which the NVA
routinely utilized as bases of operations – were equally off-limits. To the politicallyminded American planners the best option available was focusing on the war in South
Vietnam.128
Augmented by a powerful tactical air capability, artillery, and other machines of
war, the helicopter became an indispensable tool during the offensives. From November
1966 through May 1967, Westmoreland planned sustained operations, taking advantage
of the dry season which offered preferable flying conditions in the southern regions.129 In
this theater the helicopter and airmobility ―came of age.‖130 It ―balanced the odds‖ and
created ―a dramatic new dimension which allowed the precise application of a variety of
combat power.‖131 For the Army, increased reliance on the helicopter was a direct
response to the opposition‘s own strategy. The true insurgency still existed, but it was in
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fact taking secondary importance behind a growing desire for conventional warfare
among North Vietnam‘s influential commanders. Ultimately, either side committed to a
strategy of attrition. The North hoped to break American will on the battlefield through
unacceptably high casualties, while the U.S. expected to use their firepower to convince
the insurgents their efforts were futile.132
Counterinsurgency?
Despite any changes in how the enemy operated, the Army continued to classify
what they faced quite broadly as an insurgency. Debates continue among the military
history community as to whether or not the U.S. attempt to fight a counterinsurgency
with superior technology was folly; if they erroneously missed the opportunity to win
Vietnamese hearts and minds by becoming slaves to high-tech components and
conventional tactics. Observers such as Andrew Krepinevich assert that the Army
essentially abandoned counterinsurgency in favor of their central strategy of attrition
which relied upon impressive body count numbers and dazzling statistics.133 Historian
John Nagl also posits that ―the U.S. Army‘s concept of how to fight and win [through
superior firepower] precluded the development of a successful counterinsurgency
doctrine in South Vietnam.‖134 Others argue that the Army set in concrete such a strategy
before whole-sale American involvement in Southeast Asia began – airmobility planning
superseded counterinsurgency in the early 1960s Army because many believed an
increased reliance on helicopters obviated the need for true counterinsurgency doctrine.
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Still, infantry proponents of airmobility claimed that helicopters gave them the
advantage of superior flexibility and speed necessary to outmaneuver and destroy
guerrilla forces. The aversion that some infantry officers felt towards counterinsurgency
likely had more to do with personal ambition – airmobility‘s command structure was
better suited for promotions, appealing to the career-minded. Concurrently, most officers
believed technological solutions (airmobility) were more alluring than doctrinal
adjustments (counterinsurgency). Effectively, the Army ―sabotaged‖ preparations to fight
an insurgency as they ―sought to mislead deliberately by creating the appearance of
accepting the mission of counterinsurgency. It created manuals and training courses for
counterinsurgency, and claimed to be highly interested. Thus, in practice, the Army‘s
commitment was tantamount to a smokescreen.‖135
Hackworth corroborates this belief by drawing upon his experience in Infantry
School at Fort Benning in 1962, alongside soldiers who would likely take commands in
Vietnam. ―…the counterinsurgency training we were receiving wasn‘t counterinsurgency
at all,‖ he argued, ―but conventional tactics with increased mobility provided by
helicopters, or ‗choppers,‘ (As it was explained by one helicopter-enamored commander,
with choppers ‗we can bring in fresh troops, hit fast, and in thirty seconds we can clean
them out.‘)‖136 Not all soldiers allowed themselves to become so captivated by the
technological appeal of helicopters. Instead, their solutions relied upon the fundamentals
of war: ―‗We need new tactics,‘ the Special Forces pros pleaded, ‗for a protracted
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guerrilla war‘…‖137 Despite such exhortations, Hackworth noticed little truly changed
within the Army, that ―however many hours the Career Course devoted to the subject
because the Kennedy Administration demanded it, from the Infantry School point of
view, it was just a requirement, to be given a good load of lip service but little more. And
that was what it got, regardless of what the soldiers and officers truly needed or what the
war to come required.‖138
Though these comments reflect the attitude three years before pronounced
American involvement in Vietnam, much of the Infantry School‘s enthusiasm about the
helicopter reflected a prevalent assumption throughout the Army during the entire decade
– that the aircraft would carry them into future wars, no matter their composition or
objectives. Many of Hackworth‘s fellow officers in the school at the time would have
likely completed tours in Southeast Asia, just as he did. They carried with them the
training continually prevalent during the 1960s, instruction which stressed that infantry
paired with helicopters offered a formidable combination anywhere in the world in any
type of conflict. Taking these inclinations into account, it is not surprising the 1st
Cavalry‘s initial combat experience presaged how American forces would fight in
Vietnam. Ia Drang appeared to provide favorable results and seemed to convince
effectively the Army Staff that airmobility worked. Firepower and mobility meant that
the debate was over and that helicopters, tactical air support, and artillery replaced the
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traditional means of fighting an insurgency – counterinsurgency had a new
complexion.139
Bernard Fall, the foremost expert on the contemporary Western experience in
Indochina, noticed this change in the U.S. approach to Vietnam.140 With the arrival of
large units, ―Two types of warfare died in 1965-66 in Viet-Nam, in both the North and
the South: Counterinsurgency was one of them, and the national war of liberation was the
other. They were both killed by the sheer mass of American firepower thrown into the
conflict.‖141 Fall observes that U.S. power, and helicopters by implication, could ―stave
off just about any kind of military disaster,‖ which should have cost them dearly. In
proving his point he used a recent example of blunder-turned-victory when ―a helicopterborne outfit of the 101st Airborne erroneously put down in the midst of a VC assembly
area a few days ago, the result should, under normal circumstances, have been
unmitigated disaster.‖142 Rather, the event proved what he saw as typical American
insulation from the normal fundamentals of war – that technology and enhanced mobility
could rectify any military errors. Army representatives would likely delight in Fall‘s
exasperating realization that ―Against this slaughter, the teachings of Mao Tse-tung,
superior tactics, popular support for the VC, or conversely, poor motivation among the
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Arvins [ARVNs] and patent ineptness among many of their officers, and even the ‗mess
in Saigon‘ are totally irrelevant.‖143 For the Army, no matter the composition of the war –
be it against a Warsaw Pact nation or an insurgency – helicopters and technology factored
heavily into their concept of modern warfare. Whether their strategy constituted a true
counterinsurgency or not, the Army operated under the belief the helicopter was an
essential element of their Vietnam operations.
Ideas of American exceptionalism seemed to convince many among the military
elite that their approaches would not likely produce a mirrored outcome of the failed
French experience only a decade earlier. The U.S. Army‘s seeming dedication to a
continued strategy of attrition ensured the helicopter would remain a central component
of future operations. In the minds of the military planners of the day, attempts to find, fix,
and destroy NVA and VC forces required a heli-mobile army. This was not something
those among the aviation community necessarily bemoaned. Though Army Aviation may
have seemed ―uncertain of its goals‖ during the 1950s, Vietnam provided a questionless
function.144 An increasing reliance upon the helicopter gave them ample opportunities to
revise and refine their combat procedures. By 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division might have
constituted the largest dedicated airmobile force ever organized to date, but the growing
demand for helicopters meant Army Aviation would find their services more in-demand.
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How the entire Army came to terms with such a considerable assault helicopter force,
though, required continual patience, open-mindedness, and clear lines of communication.
Meeting the Need: The 1st Aviation Brigade
The second factor to impact developments in procedures and techniques was the
formation of a new aviation brigade. The Vietnam-era army was essentially an airmobile
force since the character of the war birthed a growing reliance on helicopters. Though
most infantry divisions already had their own helicopter support in the form of an
attached aviation battalion, the demands of Vietnam meant those small numbers became
inadequate. Large combat assaults and sizeable operations proved that these units were
stretched too thin. The Army looked to alleviate the pressure on these battalions while
also supplying adequate numbers of helicopters, lest planned operations become
impossible due to a lack of aircraft support. Their solution came in the form of aviation
groups composed of multiple battalions. When the numbers of these independent groups
grew, the Army formed an aviation brigade – the first aviation unit of that size – made
out of whole cloth in May 1966.
Officially, the 1st Cavalry was the only airmobile division until the 101st
Airborne‘s reconfiguration. Indeed, few divisions or subordinate commands were
airmobile, but all employed a degree of airmobility despite their lack of official
configuration. Helicopter units fell into two categories: organic and non-organic. The 1st
Cavalry enjoyed its own ―organic‖ aviation groups, meaning these helicopters belonged
directly to the 1st Cav, for their explicit use. Such command relationships were beneficial
to an airmobile division so reliant upon helicopters as prime movers of men and
equipment. Additionally, having organic air assets also precluded the necessity of
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requisitioning helicopters from other commands. Infantry divisions not in an official
airmobile configuration had organic helicopter units as well. They utilized their own
aviation battalion – along with an air cavalry troop of observation and attack helicopters –
while some smaller units came equipped with modest aviation sections to provide general
support.
The 1st Aviation Brigade fell under the second category, non-organic aviation –
the only such unit in Vietnam. Their existence was based exclusively upon the
overwhelming need for aircraft within Southeast Asia. Brigade helicopters supported
various infantry units who either did not have their own aircraft or who needed extra help
within their area of operation. Not belonging to an infantry command, their sole existence
was to assist any ground forces in need of aviation support.145 With such a large
helicopter force in-country, the opportunities to develop and implement new ideas across
the entirety of South Vietnam grew exponentially.
Their formation was a ground-breaking moment for not only Army Aviation, but
helicopter warfare in general. When U.S. offensive operations became more prevalent the
Army faced the dilemma of increasing numbers of ground units who required aviation
support.146 As stretched as these assets already were, the situation was complicated
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because of the uncharted aspects of it – the aviation units had little prior experience
supporting non-airmobile divisions and were ―not sure of the proper mix.‖147 A lack of
Hueys and pilots necessitated a distribution of one assault helicopter company per
brigade – a significantly disproportionate ratio compared to the 1st Cavalry‘s support
structure.148 Prior methods of lending the limited numbers of helicopters to other
divisions had become too unwieldy and difficult to manage given the lack of centralized
command. The Army ordered Brigadier General George P. ―Phip‖ Seneff, Jr. to form the
aviation brigade to solve the problem. As an 11th Air Assault Division veteran, he
brought experience and an uncompromising vision of what he believed the airmobile
potential to be. The mission was a daunting one: to offer non-organic Army aviation to
those in need of it – to ―provide tactical mobility for combat troops, supplies, and
equipment‖ – in a timely and effective manner.149
Not only was the 1st responsible for assisting American infantry commands, but
ARVN divisions and one Republic of Korea division expected U.S. helicopter assistance
as well. They divided assets into different Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ).150 Three of the
four CTZs had an aviation group which acted as a pool. Ground commands liaised with
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their corps‘ aviation group to request helicopter assets as needed.151 As a result, ground
troops received attached helicopters for a predetermined amount of time, tasked with
specific missions. The U.S. 1st, 4th, 9th, 101st, and 25th Infantry Divisions depended upon
aviation support from 1st Aviation Brigade units, beyond what their own organic
battalions provided.152 By 1966, the potential offered by attached helicopters signaled a
shift in traditional infantry capabilities.
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Who knows best?: Ground commanders and utilizing their “assets”
Although they were independent of the infantry, ground commanders used nonorganic helicopters as he would any other asset typically assigned to them. This made for
a good working relationship for helicopter crews who habitually supported the same
ground unit, but it could cause problems between those who were not as well acquainted.
Infantry commanders could on occasion not fully appreciate helicopter crews‘
procedures, demanding performance of duties outside of what was considered safe,
advisable, or efficient. Since the Army believed that the helicopter‘s role was to assist
ground operations, infantry leaders viewed any attached aircraft and its crew as a direct
asset, subject to orders and under their chain of command. This is not a particularly
curious line of thinking, as for the most part helicopters rarely acted in any capacity other
than aiding the infantry – it stood as the basis on which airmobility was built.154
Army Aviation found that a lack of familiarity, or blatant disregard, among
ground commanders about correct procedures could result in a misallocation of attached
aircraft. Helicopters sent to resupply infantry units found themselves ordered to insert or
extract ground forces in ―instantaneous combat assaults,‖ which was in ―complete
disagreement with all instructions and standard operating procedures in force.‖155 Not
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only were the air crews unprepared, but because requests had not traveled the official
channels they were without their customary gunship support or accompanied by other
aircraft to assist in their own recovery if shot down. Officially such practices were ―a
misuse of aircraft resources and a potential hazard to all personnel concerned.‖ 156
Unplanned detours also affected the support others expected to receive from the aircraft
in question. More importantly, though, these instances indicate the attitudes of some
among the infantry – that helicopters existed to satisfy their unit‘s desire, regardless of
customary procedures. In the minds of pilots, either intentionally or not, ground
commanders abused their authority.157
Despite any hesitation pilots and crews, or even aviation battalion commanders
for that matter, felt about fulfilling missions ordered by ground units, it was still their
duty to comply. The 1st Aviation Brigade made known that their roles were well defined.
As to the question of ―what a guy does or should do when he feels he has to turn down a
mission or the mission is too difficult,‖ they had an obligation: ―The weather can be
deteriorating – the question of too much fire in an area, too hot an LZ, etc. The basic
principle throughout is that the ground commander is the boss and let‘s not forget it or let
our people forget it! If ground commanders want our people to do something, we do
it!‖158 Though assault helicopter units still possessed options by appealing through
aviation channels, the matter ultimately rested upon the fundamental concept of
maintaining a rapport with ground commanders. ―The best way to avoid a fracas of this
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sort‖ the brigade advised, ―is to have personal relationships to avoid anything
approaching an argument in this direction.‖159 Above all, their rapport had to be strong
enough that they ―accept your advice and try to find a way of performing the missions as
required.‖160 Without a doubt, proper liaison between supporter and those whom they
supported remained one of the most important aspects of non-organic airmobile unit
operations.
In some ways there was a noticeable difference between the typical infantryman
and the air crews who flew them to and from combat. Though they all received the same
basic training and belonged to the larger organization, given the lack of a dedicated
aviation branch it became easy for ranking officers to marginalize and subordinate the
contribution of aviation personnel. To an extent there was a distance between pilots and
troops on the ground. In the instance of non-organic helicopter units, they lived
separately, only generally coming into contact during assigned missions; still, it was rare
for crews to see the same infantryman twice, let alone strike up a close relationship.161
Even during occasions when they did meet, many were unrecognizable to each other.
Pilots existed as disconnected voices in the sky, and when in-flight with passengers the
close proximity between cabin and cockpit belied the real impossibility of gaining
familiarity – flight noise, complicated procedures, lack of an intercom system to the
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passengers, and a general high level of concentration on the task at hand prevented any
attempts at acquaintanceship.162
When they did have the fortune to meet on the ground and in a relaxed
environment, however, it was a chance to bond. ―It wasn‘t too often that guys on the
ground met the men who supported them and vice versa,‖ mentions Colonel David
Hackworth, ―so there was immediate camaraderie among us. And there was a lot of
mutual respect, too. We looked in awe at the pilots for some of the amazing risks they
took in our support…the pilots treated us infantry guys as if we were Wyatt Earp
gunfighters in the old Tombstone bar.‖163 Certainly many of the younger infantrymen
appreciated the advantage helicopters offered them, but for many ground commanders it
ultimately came down to their belief the aircraft was simply a tool at their disposal, an
added dimension on the battlefield, ―‗another vehicle, another weapons system‘ – but one
that could fly.‖164
Even the more mundane tasks of assault helicopter units required a degree of
communicating proper procedures to supported ground units. Not all helicopter pilots
spent the majority of their tour flying combat assaults. Rather, the day-to-day routine
consisted mainly of resupplying infantry units in various locations, either at fire support
bases or in the field during active operations. Though not necessarily considered combat
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missions, these ―log‖ missions [logistics], or ―ash and trash‖ as crews typically termed
them, were still dangerous in their own right. They may not have been massed assaults
into landing zones under enemy fire, but ash and trash flights still required flying over
enemy territory.
Of importance also was the strain upon the crews. W.T. Grant, a pilot with the
17th Assault Helicopter Company explains the difference in missions and the frustration
they caused. Assigned aircraft resupplied infantry battalions, hauling the needed ―food,
ammunition, medical supplies, and equipment that the battalion would need until its next
log bird arrived. The log bird was also required to perform the ‗admin‘ missions for the
battalion – hauling the battalion commander around to visit his companies, replacement
soldiers to the field, short-timers and injured soldiers to the rear.‖ As routine as the tasks
sound, occasionally pilots confronted the inability of ground units to plan their resupplies
well enough, causing the mission to be ―frequently interrupted by captain so-and-so who
wanted to go here or there. Log missions were usually long and frustrating.‖165 Certainly
helicopter crews were in a support role, subject to the whims of those who they assisted,
but it made it no less easy on the aviators. Arriving alone at infantry bases and delivering
men and supplies could give one the impression helicopters were little more than ―taxicabs‖ for the rest of the Army.
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As the war progressed and ground commander became more comfortable using
helicopters, micro-management of combat assaults developed into an increasing
annoyance to aviation battalions. By 1968 records show intensified efforts by ground
units to usurp dedicated chains of command during operations. Army General John J.
Tolson asserts that he was struck by ―the matter-of-fact attitude‖ of how ground
commands that used attached helicopters saw these assets. After the initial trials of 1965
and into the offensive operations of 1966-67, ―these units took airmobility for granted,‖
oftentimes simply considering ―themselves as much airmobile as the 1st Cavalry Division
although they were not officially designated as such.‖166 It became more prevalent as the
war progressed, but Tolson is spot-on with his assertion that ―Every commander
instinctively knew that he could do certain things with ‗his‘ Hueys. . . .‖ That predilection
towards hyper-management was not lost on the supporting aviation companies.167
Command and control aircraft which offered infantry officers the ability to direct
their ground elements, transformed into airborne headquarters of over-controlling leaders.
Their attempts to appropriate helicopter assets mid-operation often devolved the combat
assaults into micro-managed turmoil. During the end of 1968 the 101st Aviation Battalion
determined that ―routine missions are over controlled to the point where aviators are
almost removed from the planning phase completely.‖168 Though standard operating
procedures dictated that a C&C aircraft should control the operation, the aviation
battalion considered this a ―misutilization‖ of aircraft when the routine mission only
166

Tolson, Airmobility, 84.

167

Ibid., 84, 85.

168

Department of the Army, Headquarters 101st Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter), ―Operational
Report of 101st Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) for Period Ending 31 January 1969,‖ p. 8, Aviation
Box 351, Folder 3, RG 472, NACP.

66
consisted of five troop-carrying helicopters. If properly briefed by the ground units, they
argued, there was ―no substantial reason for the infantry commander and staff officers to
control routine missions. Aviation flights have been accomplishing this for years, and are
capable of continuing to do so without‖ the added complication of a C&C aircraft.169
Though the infantry had been touting heli-borne warfare as the wave of the future
for some time, combat proved there was a long way to go before aviation and infantry
could operate together smoothly. A simple lack of experience or inflexibility among
ground commanders meant some did not comply with what assault helicopter units
determined to be the correct procedures. Whether they viewed the aircraft as taxi cabs or
their own personal air force, without acting in accordance with the appropriate methods,
their actions could either cause waste or put helicopter crews needlessly in danger.
Despite the occasional issues when facing obdurate infantry commanders, Army Aviation
continued to develop, refine, and implement their combat procedures.
My backyard, my methods
The third factor to affect the development of assault helicopter doctrine was an
effort to standardize techniques and procedures. Due to the disparity in geography,
mission, and unit standard procedures, it was difficult, if not impossible, to draft an
overall Vietnam tactical manual. Aviation commands could sometimes employ varied
and unique standard procedures, different than those employed by similar units elsewhere
in Vietnam. This lack of a unified approach offered many helicopter units a degree of ad
hoc improvisation, unburdened by a prescribed doctrine.
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Despite the inherent difficulty, the 1st Aviation Brigade attempted to solve the
practice of diverse procedures among their subordinate units. Beginning in 1966, in the
early weeks of their existence, Brigade Commander Brigadier General Seneff made
known his desire to emphasize standardized methods of operations, mentioning in his
first official correspondence to his brigade that ―This headquarters will publish a tactics
and techniques SOP covering these and other subjects as a first priority task.‖170
Believing standardized ―flying tactics and operational techniques‖ could improve
―overall mission capability,‖ the issue was worth mentioning as the very first official
order of business which the commander wished to address. Throughout 1966 the brigade
conducted command and staff visits to its subordinate battalions and companies to study
each one‘s methods for the area. Their purpose was to collect information which could
―result in standardizing, as much as possible, the techniques and procedures to be used in
all areas of operation.‖171
The basis of the doctrine traced back to the 11th Air Assault Division – no surprise
given Seneff‘s former affiliation. From there, the brigade‘s own combat experience
culled from official reports and comments from the field augmented the principles as
used by the 1st Cavalry Division.172 The resulting Brigade Operations Manual detailed
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pertinent aspects of airmobility – specifically products of a Vietnam experience –
intended for consumption by aviator and infantryman alike. Not only did it allow the
command to offer a program of consistent procedures for ease of operations, but it
informed the ground units of assault helicopters‘ capabilities.
In a sense the brigade knew that they would encounter some amount of obduracy
amongst the infantry units. Seneff‘s language on the matter is offensive-minded, warning
his subordinates that ―Selling this isn‘t going to be easy.‖173 One must appreciate that the
infantry whom the 1st supported were not as extensively trained as the 1st Cavalry in the
methods of heli-borne warfare. The manual served to introduce many techniques in
which ground commanders may not have been well accustomed in hopes of ―stressing
capabilities and limitations of supporting aviation units.‖174 As a means to acquaint the
supported infantry, the brigade sent a ―Briefing Team‖ to each major command incountry throughout 1967.175
In order to foster strong relationships between ground units and their aviation
support, as often as possible non-organic helicopter commands attempted to pair specific
aviation units with infantry battalions they had supported in the past. The 1st Aviation
By November, the brigade began the first changes to the manual. The revision committee‘s members came
from within the brigade, along with personnel from the 1 st Cavalry Division. Department of the Army,
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Brigade found after discovering harmonious relationships they should capitalize upon
these experiences and in future instances continue such pairings when feasible. In a real
sense this practice was only logical, because the ―more a supporting aviation unit knows
about its supported unit, the better its capability of providing the best possible
support.‖176 Once aviators became comfortable with how particular infantry units
operated, their services could become better utilized, with less time and effort wasted reorientating their methods for whom they supported. Good rapport between the
commanders of ground and aviation assets was key to ―build and sustain a unique
confidence which has proven substantially responsible for maintaining operational
stability during critical combat situations.‖177 Quite clearly, interpersonal relationships
dictated much of airmobility‘s success or possible failure.
Due to the varied terrain in Vietnam, not every unit throughout the country
adhered to the same tactical procedures. The mountains of northern RVN often
necessitated entirely different operating techniques than in the rice paddies of the south.
Helicopter crews who faced densely forested areas met with the reality that available
landing zones proved difficult to find and even more challenging to use safely. Aviators
operating in the Delta region employed altered procedures tailored to meet the enemy
resistance in the area, oftentimes local Viet Cong, not the North Vietnamese regulars to
the north.178 Varied terrain consisted of more than mountains and paddies as popular
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memory may suggest, however. Wooded areas covered flat ground, hedgerows or other
barriers often bordered farm fields, and heavily vegetated plateaus covered in mostly high
grasses obscured distances to the ground.179 As a result, helicopter companies or
battalions devised methods applicable to the geographical environments in which they
operated.
Unique procedures, common to one unit but unusual to others, made it difficult to
work alongside helicopter units unfamiliar with a particular area. The 101st Aviation
Battalion discovered the disparity in each aviation unit‘s techniques during the 1969
operation Lamar Plain. Normally headquartered in central I Corps, a company from the
battalion relocated to southern I Corps in preparation for Lamar Plain. One of the
fundamental lessons the 101st learned during the operation dealt with how their
techniques compared to other units. They noted that ―Aviation units have to be versatile
on all combat operations‖ and Lamar Plains ―proved that different units in Vietnam have
completely different tactics and means of employing these tactics.‖180 The point was not
academic, as ―Small problems were encountered by the use of set tactics and two units
working together without an understanding of the others tactics.‖181 Many assault
helicopter battalions had spent considerable effort standardizing methods within their
own unit.
violent.‖ They proposed airmobile units exercise ―SOP‘s [sic] and battle drills which permit quick response
to tactical opportunities and changes in the situation.‖ Recognizing this was a unique necessity to certain
areas, though, they warned that this discussion regarded ―situations particular to operations in the Delta
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Just as particular areas of operation (AO) required unique approaches, the infantry
also tailored their operations to the geographic areas in which they operated. As these
ground and air commands worked together, they formed a mostly unofficial approach to
their AO, sharing an understanding of how best to use their assets. For this reason, in the
instance of II Field Force Vietnam, planners often strove for a continuity of pairing
assault helicopter companies (AHCs) with familiar ground units.182 Reportedly, due to
the exhortations of one commanding general there, the pairing of aviation units to
specific infantry counterparts remained mostly consistent. He was heard to have quipped
in response to a suggested reassignment in the Mekong River Delta, ―Don‘t take that unit
out of there; they‘ve got web-feet!‖183
An appreciation of how terrain affected tactics was not lost on one officer who
explained that ―Up north, for example, there were jungles and hill, and forests. The
Choppers had to come in vertically over 150-200-foot trees into holes in the vegetation.‖
Operations in the Mekong River Delta of III and IV Corps meant ―the aircraft were used
a lot with boats, and this required different techniques. And in rice paddy areas, troops
have to be inserted in a totally different way….‖184 Fundamentally, the officer illustrates
his understanding ―that the areas are so different,‖ it necessitated that ―the expertise that
is developed in each should be kept there.‖185 Overall, standardization of aviation
techniques across Vietnam was not easily solvable as a result of terrain, areas of
operation, and command relationships.
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The Enemy Reacts
The final component to affect developments in techniques and procedures was the
opposition‘s own reaction to helicopters. Due to an increased presence of Army aircraft,
throughout 1966 and onward the NVA and VC shifted their tactics in response to the
helicopter threat. Reversion back to guerrilla-type warfare and employment of
increasingly lethal anti-helicopter devices illustrated a growing familiarity with U.S.
capabilities and procedures. Their adjustments required Army Aviation not only note the
changes, but to respond to them effectively.
Employment of anti-helicopter techniques and devices by the enemy during the
Vietnam War began with primitive measures, but gradually they grew in lethality and
sophistication. The Viet Cong understood well the importance of LZs to heli-borne
operations, and captured documents from 1966 exposed this reality.186 Knowledge of
anti-helicopter methods filtered up through the chain of command, garnering attention
even in the Pentagon. In a 1967 Pentagon press briefing the 1st Aviation Brigade‘s
commander mentioned that ―The enemy in RVN has tried to develop effective means to
impede heli-borne operations. New enemy tactics require a concentrated effort on our
part to learn their techniques in sufficient time to render them ineffective.‖187 Common
methods included planting mines and booby traps in potential landing zones with the aim
of destroying vulnerable aircraft. Army helicopters encountered both pressure and
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command detonated mines and most often these devices were affixed to trees, hidden on
rice paddy dikes, or small mounds. American standard procedure to counter these threats
became the employment of Air Force ―daisy cutters‖ – a conventional bomb used to
demolish large tracts of dense foliage with devastating effectiveness – in order to destroy
any such devices. Commanders were also advised to avoid landing on dikes and away
from tree lines where mines or booby traps were likely located.188 Despite their best
attempts at altering procedures, though, aviation units could sometimes employ almost
formulaic approaches to combat assaults.189 Certainly air assaults could become habitual
in their execution, as not all required innovative thinking. Changes in the enemy‘s tactics,
though, ultimately forced aviation units to revaluate their standard procedures and
appreciate their adversary‘s own capabilities.
The most noticeable change made by the opposition, though, was their
unwillingness to fight conventionally as they had at Ia Drang. U.S. mobility and quick
reaction time meant NVA and VC forces were not likely to offer open battle, and
throughout 1966 they had proven increasingly difficult to find. A larger American
presence and the growing numbers of aviation units forced a dispersion of their onceconcentrated units. It does not seem too unusual that the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Army would shift their tactics; not to do so would have meant an inability to
evolve just as most militaries are obligated to do when faced with battlefield defeats.
Americans noted modification of their ground-unit maneuvers in late 1966 when the 1st
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Aviation Brigade observed that because of continued U.S. victories ―it has become
apparent that the Viet Cong now consider it tactically unsound to mass their troops. This
is primarily due to the airmobility available to the ground forces . . . . Therefore the VC
seem to have chosen a regressive path back to guerilla type warfare.‖190 Understanding
that changes in the opposition‘s tactics required appropriate counter-measures, the
brigade suggested reviewing their current procedures ―in order to adapt new techniques
that are tailored to the changing tactics of ground forces on both sides. Units should
concentrate on developing more effective methods of accomplishing missions . . . .‖191
Changes in ground maneuvers directly affected how helicopters assisted the infantry they
supported, meaning previously utilized techniques required alterations.
It was in part the increased presence of U.S. aircraft that caused the insurgents
and regular units to become more difficult to find. During this period the scale of
helicopter operations and the numbers available increased dramatically. Eleven Army
helicopter companies deployed to Vietnam in early 1966, increasing Westmoreland‘s
inventory to 1,374 Hueys. An additional sixteen companies arrived during the first six
months of 1967, followed by twenty-three in the latter half.192 Tied intimately with the
growing strategy of attrition, the Army upheld the belief that airmobility was ―one of the
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major tactical advantages possessed by the allied forces.‖193 Throughout 1966, however,
they understood that airmobility had to adapt. It was clear that the ―techniques of
airmobile operations are undergoing continual refinement and new lessons are being
learned as different environmental conditions or different enemy tactics and techniques
are encountered.‖194
When the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong did come out of their sanctuaries to
fight during the 31 January 1968 Tet Offensive, assault helicopter units altered their
normal procedures in response. The enemy‘s comprehensive night-time attack on urban
centers, government buildings, and many major allied installations required
improvisation from Army Aviation. Assault helicopter companies flew throughout the
night supplying isolated outposts and bases with crucial supplies. Breaking up into
smaller elements the next day, sometimes only one or two helicopters each, AHCs hauled
badly need supplies to replenish those used throughout the night of frenetic battle. They
made numerous assaults, picking up and inserting infantry in attempts to surround and
destroy the fleeing enemy who retreated in fractured bands. Small unit actions typified
most of the aviation operations in response to Tet, lasting weeks after the initial
offensive.195 Operationally their response to a surprise offensive demonstrated procedural
dexterity among aviation units, forcing ad hoc revision to how most pilots were used to
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operating. For the entirety of Vietnam, Army Aviation had to alter continually their
methods and procedures in direct response to the actions of their opposition. The best
illustration of that fact, however, is found in the culminating U.S. operation of the war,
where prior experience and methods did not prepare helicopter units for a more
sophisticated North Vietnamese Army.
The Reckoning: Lam Son 719
The NVA demonstrated in 1971 just how sophisticated their weapons and antihelicopter methods had become during the United States-supported Operation Lam Son
719.196 An offensive into Laos by American and South Vietnamese forces in order to
disrupt the flow of supplies into RVN, the operation proved to be a final large test of
airmobility in the Vietnam War.197 The tactics pioneered and refined throughout South
Vietnam proved disastrous in Laos. Despite the Army‘s mostly successful
implementation of airmobility to date, Lam Son 719 was a sobering event which called
their helicopter doctrine into question. The operation was a milestone while
simultaneously a black-eye for Army Aviation. Though, it was the largest singular mass
air assault in their history to that point, it also exacted the worst rate of attrition in aircraft
shot down or damaged during the decade of conflict.
In the months preceding Lam Son 719, American and South Vietnamese
intelligence showed that North Vietnamese intentions for the coming dry season in Laos,
October 1970 to April 1971, was to open up supply lines into RVN in preparation for a
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large offensive. With this information in mind, allied forces planned to disrupt their
opposition‘s supply routes and halt the offensive before it began. Given U.S. President
Richard Nixon‘s policy of Vietnamization – an attempt to lessen the American presence
in Vietnam by handing over more operational responsibility to the South Vietnamese
military – no U.S. troops took part in the ground portion of Lam Son 719. It constituted
the largest combined operation between the allies. Allied planners intended to evidence
the ARVN‘s progress in combat effectiveness by giving them the responsibility for
ground unit actions.198 Rules of engagement limited the extent to which Americans could
operate. Helicopter pilots could not land while in Laos unless inserting or extracting
troops, or while delivering supplies and equipment.199 American forces, however,
provided the crucial air support in helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Chief among the
helicopter assets was the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), who provided the bulk of
supporting aircraft with their own organic assets, along with sundry other aviation units
under temporary operational control.200
Throughout the era of direct American involvement in Vietnam, the war qualified
as a ―low-intensity conflict‖ – an insurgency of varying composition fought by small
units utilizing basic weapons and tactics. By the late 1960s and into 1970, however, after
the Ho Chi Minh trail began operating more effectively and dedicated anti-aircraft
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weaponry from sympathetic communist countries could arrive in the south, helicopter
crews began facing more lethal armaments. Along with these weapons the NVA
developed a greater understanding of how to employ them against helicopters. Lam Son
719 was the first time Army Aviation experienced the more complicated North
Vietnamese weapons and tactics, qualifying as a ―mid-intensity conflict‖ where
―combatants employ their most modern military technology and military resources short
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.‖201 Beyond the threat of booby-traps and
rocket propelled grenades in the landing zones to which American crews had become
accustomed, this was an entirely different menace. Helicopter pilots and crews had no
prior experience on which to rely when they initially launched the operation. Stateside
training, in-country orientation, and prior combat knowledge offered no suggestions for
dealing with such a dense network of formidable surface-to-air weaponry.
Neutral Laos offered the enemy an advantage in planning and capabilities.
Understanding the likelihood of an allied cross-border offensive, communist forces
prepared defensively. Additionally, unlike in South Vietnam where Americans could
preclude substantial massing of men and equipment, NVA preparations could occur with
greater ease.202 Utilizing their knowledge of LZ and PZ ambush techniques, the North
Vietnamese Army was able to bring to bear concentrated fire on Army aircraft.203 The
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NVA effectively coordinated their complex network of air defenses and accurately fired
upon LZs and PZs. Some anti-aircraft weaponry was radar-controlled and they directed
simultaneous mortar, artillery, and rocket fire towards the most potential landing and
pickup zones throughout the area.204
Due to the dense and effective ground fire, U.S. gunship support, so effective in
most previous air assaults, could do little to suppress the anti-aircraft threat. Lift units
found themselves overwhelmed throughout most of the forty-five day operation. So
accurate was the anti-aircraft fire that every mission, no matter size or objective, required
specific planning to lessen the risk of more grievous losses.205 Few aircraft did not
experience some degree of combat damage. For those waiting at Khe Sanh, the staging
area for aviation units during the operation, returning helicopters crippled by enemy fire
became a common sight. One aviator commented that ―Army pilots were living proof of
months of difficult training. Countless repetitive emergency procedures were put to
reflexive use.‖206
Throughout most of the Vietnam War, flights often flew at an advised 1,500 feet
or higher to avoid small arms fire, and due to safety concerns combat assaults usually
adhered to this recommendation. However, in Laos such guidelines exposed aircraft to
accurate ground-to-air fire. By the end of Lam Son 719, helicopter pilots used single ship
insertions at thirty second intervals combined with low level flight into and out of the
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landing or pick-up zones in order to avoid enemy fire.207 Operational flexibility was the
hallmark of the operation, as it required quick adaptability by assault helicopter
companies to the combat situation.
Understanding the unique nature of Lam Son 719 in terms of the overall Vietnam
experience, the 101st Airborne Division‘s headquarters conducted considerably thorough
examinations of the operation in an attempt to ―record the history of the airmobile aspects
. . . and derive lessons and guidelines to improve current and future airmobile operations,
organization, and doctrine.‖208 The Division looked towards the future of airmobile
operations, disseminating the lessons learned from Lam Son 719 most directly applicable
to Europe and mid-intensity conflict, something they deemed a ―special case.‖ Regardless
of the uniqueness of the operation, they felt that it represented the positive aspects of
airmobility, which confirmed ―the soundness and validity of the concept and principles of
airmobility developed and practiced by the United States Army.‖209 Despite the historical
memory of the operation as one which constituted a Pyrrhic victory – losses in
helicopters outweighed the true gains made during Lam Son 719 – the 101st considered it
a matter of perspective. The division felt there were ―remarkably few helicopters and
crew members lost‖ in spite of the high numbers of sorties flown in heavy anti-aircraft
and ground fire ―on NVA home ground.‖210
The very nature of what the airmobile units experienced in Laos was something to
which they were not accustomed. For close to a decade Army Aviation operated against a
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rather unsophisticated foe. Though the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong made efforts to
combat helicopters, they did not constitute a grave surface-to-air threat until 1971. Even
then it was perhaps more due to the particular circumstances of their extensively-prepared
sanctuary area. To some, the operation was proof that airmobility was a flawed concept.
It could be heralded, however, as an illustration of the developing nature of the concept
itself. Official reports are replete with observations of methods and procedures unique to
Lam Son 719 – few prior operations received such thorough analysis. It provided insight
that the previous decade of combat knowledge could not. In that regard, Lam Son 719 is
an appropriate bookend to the story of helicopter operations. It emphasizes the continual
adaptation and refinement of procedures, techniques, and tactics used by Army assault
helicopters throughout the Vietnam War.
Conclusion
Following the 1st Cavalry Division‘s actions during the1965 Pleiku Campaign it
appeared evident that airmobility was to become an important aspect of American
military operations. It is likely few could imagine, however, the extent to which
helicopters became, arguably, the major component of the U.S. Army effort in Southeast
Asia. Indeed, examples of effusive praise for the helicopter abound from members of the
Army. Much of their approval mirrors one aviation battalion commander‘s belief that
―The helicopter in Vietnam has proven itself beyond any doubt as the vehicle primarily
responsible for the success of our ground forces in the combat theater.‖211 Central among
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the types of aircraft was the utility helicopter, one which flew daily – and nightly – across
South Vietnam completing numerous tasks.
Noteworthy among the many outcomes of the Army‘s reliance upon helicopters is
the formation of the 1st Aviation Brigade. Buoyed by the 1st Cavalry Division‘s success at
Ia Drang and supported by the supreme commander of allied forces, General
Westmoreland, it should perhaps not be surprising helicopters took on such a crucial role.
Conventional infantry divisions enjoyed a degree of airmobility not originally envisioned
by the earliest supporters of the concept; many foresaw dedicated airmobile divisions, but
few predicted an entire airmobile army. Already by 1966 General Howze noticed that
many infantry units had gained an airmobile capability not altogether inferior to that of
the 1st Cavalry. The supply of aircraft eventually met the need, since helicopters had
become such a crucial requirement. As Howze further notes ―the alternative would be to
deny them an essential means of combat.‖212 To a large degree, the Army did become
airmobile; if not officially designated as such they certainly relied upon that capability in
a real sense. American military planners designed the types of operations infantry units
undertook in Vietnam throughout 1966 and into 1971 with the helicopter in mind. Indeed,
one can hardly imagine the offensives which typified the era as possible with
conventional transportation means.
These capabilities were not something the Army inherently knew how to exercise
from the outset, though. Rather, it required imagination and gradual innovations to refine
the methods of utilizing helicopters in a counterinsurgency. Given Army Aviation‘s
relative youth, Vietnam was the requisite testing ground needed to improve their doctrine.
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While other Army branches had the benefit of decades or more of preparation to solidify
procedures, assault helicopter units operated on a very limited basis of experience.
Conversely, those with whom aviators worked had even less of an understanding. In 1966
Brigadier General Seneff commented that ―All other combat branches of the Army have
firm tactical doctrine. Liaison, communications, operational planning, support procedures
and tactics have been developed over a long period of time and are accepted as standard
throughout the military.‖213 In order to become effective quickly Army Aviation had to
become just as consistent with their methods to facilitate understanding among the
infantry of how to use helicopters. Assuredly, the Army entered Vietnam as a force
familiar with helicopters, but not intimately knowledgeable in the methods required to
combat an insurgency with them. They had to devise those means, while simultaneously
creating reliable and efficient doctrine.
As a result of the culmination of knowledge gained successively throughout the
war, an altered strategic approach, and in response to the enemy‘s own tactical revisions,
there was never a moment when airmobility and helicopter techniques became solidified
enough not to demand further modifications. Indeed, regarding the enemy‘s effect on
procedures one colonel commented in 1966 that ―One cannot tell from one day to the
next what reaction will come from the enemy . . . . Every day sees changes in tactics and
techniques as the continuous quest for better methods of defeating the VC goes on.‖214
Throughout the historical record, official reports from aviation units contain innumerable
instances of an army coming to terms with their mission and the procedures which could
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best serve the objectives. To some degree it necessitated winning over some obdurate
members of the ground forces community, educating all as to the potential and correct
employment of helicopters on the modern battlefield. If airmobility came of age in 1966,
it matured further in the following years. In the main, the concept was sound, but
refinements in tactics, procedures, and mission signaled there was still much to learn
about its usage. How Army Aviation communicated such insight, theories, and ideas was
crucial in order to remain a viable force. For that it required a network of information
channels to translate experiences from the pilot‘s seat into inherited wisdom.

CHAPTER 3: COMMUNICATING AND DISSEMINATING INNOVATION
―How many costly mistakes have been repeated and lives lost as the thousands of
Army aviators . . . searched for effective tactics and techniques which had already been
employed but not shared?‖215 This question posed by a major in 1968 was a relevant one
at the time. Battlefield knowledge collected by helicopter units about how to combat an
insurgency had the propensity to become confused, if not lost, unless compiled in an
efficient manner. As a result there were four main methods of relating combat
experience. First, the official Army Operational Report – Lessons Learned detailed
aspects of operations conducted in Vietnam. Second was the publication of military
periodicals containing articles which encouraged an unofficial dissemination of ideas.
Third, a close connection between Vietnam battlefields and Army Aviation‘s training
schools ensured a curriculum that reflected combat experiences. Finally, in-country
orientation, which taught pilots newly-arrived in Vietnam refined training alongside
veterans. All of these methods constituted extensive means of relating insights and
translating them into reliable doctrine. It is demonstrative of a military coming to terms
with a new technology, and an example of how such a force reports, interprets, and
evaluates knowledge gained through combat experience.
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Operational Reports – Lessons Learned
Among the official means of communicating new information was the
Operational Report – Lessons Learned (OR-LL). They were a record of ―significant
organization or unit activities‖ in which each unit took part throughout three month
periods, including total hours flown, combat losses, and the manifold logistics of war. In
contrast to the sometimes narrow-sighted after-action reports, OR-LLs generally
examined the larger picture of how and where a particular unit operated during the
reporting period. Most important for tactical evolution, though, were the ―lessons
learned‖ portion of each OR-LL. Not only did they provide a historical account of
specific units, but they enabled the Army to record the observations and
recommendations of combat commanders.216 Importantly, these covered multiple aspects
of combat, including ―joint and combined operations and support activities pertinent to
doctrine, organization, equipment, training, administration, techniques, and tactics.‖217
The lessons learned contained issues encountered during all types of sorties or operations.
Commanders expressed ideas on tactics, techniques, and procedures, and recommended
action at the appropriate level.218
To a great extent these items reveal that certain issues could come to light only on
the battlefield. In the words of one aviation battalion commander the ―lessons to be
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learned in airmobile concepts can only be taught here in the combat theater.‖219
Airmobility, he argued, was still evolving, and ―solutions to heliborne tactics are still
being discovered, still being exploited. The hard, fast, rules still emanate from the fire
received in an enemy occupied landing zone.‖220 Though prior stateside tests provided a
foundation, combat dictated what truly worked, and Army Aviation relied on OR-LLs to
communicate that information for larger dissemination.
The notable aspect of the system was the dialogue it created, as reports from
subordinate units which filtered up the chain of command required either their agreement
or ―nonconcur.‖ If the headquarters found the suggestions worth endorsing, those
solutions could ultimately become standard procedure for other units. Multiple levels of
the chain of command scrutinized OR-LLs. Eventually the Army Chief of Staff, Force
Development, Department of the Army in Washington D.C. received the modified report.
Ultimately, this process directly affected future training, as those involved in the review
could recommend ―appropriate CONUS [Continental United States] training agencies
consider the recommendation as stated.‖221 For the most part this denoted the Army
Aviation training center at Fort Rucker, but the benefits of OR-LLs extended beyond
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aviation, too.222 The information acted as academic data for the Army‘s future leaders –
all branch training schools received copies of the reports ―for review and evaluation,‖
including the War College, Armor, Aviation, and Infantry Schools among others.223
Indeed, since airmobility was such an important aspect of the Vietnam-era military, other
branches would likely benefit from a knowledge of how airmobile units operated.
Open exchanges of ideas extended to most of the assault helicopter units. Their
experiences, difficulties, and solutions became important information for others.
Dissemination of OR-LLs occurred throughout Vietnam, and in one form or another they
found relevance among fellow aviation commands. Some, as in the case of the 101st
Airborne Division‘s organic aviation unit, the 101st Assault Helicopter Battalion,
published a bulletin with salient points gathered from other units, believing that to profit
adequately from these experiences meant implementing similar methods.224 The 1st
Aviation Brigade practiced a similar method. Comprised of tactical lessons from their
subordinate battalions and companies, they compiled multiple ―Tactical Lessons
Learned‖ reports ―with a view toward ‗spreading the word‘ so that successful techniques
employed by one unit may be made known to others so that we may all learn from each
others [sic] mistakes.‖225
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Aviation commands considered any information which might have been helpful to
the training schools. As the former Director of Army Aviation, brigade commander
Major General George P. Seneff, Jr. understood the importance of OR-LLs and the
training curriculum‘s dependence on them. In 1967 he informed his subordinates that
―My staff is working on, as always, studies on doctrine, tactics and techniques of
airmobile operations, etc.‖226 Partly to help in standardization, but also to be
―appropriately incorporated in service schools at Rucker, Benning, and other places
where people are being prepared to come over here.‖227 Pointedly, Seneff reveals that this
effort was ―completely dependent on you people to put good information in Your [sic]
Operation Lessons Learned and other reporting that you send us.‖228
Above all, Seneff‘s orders illustrate an important desire to adapt and innovate. In
June 1966 he emphasized the universality of lessons learned. Encouraging the reporting
of these issues, he observed that what might appear ―an insignificant or routine approach
to a problem may be a big help to another unit. Be sure your Quarterly Operations Report
contains details of lessons learned so we can consolidate and distribute them across the
board.‖229 Seneff advocated even further means of relaying ideas inside the combat
theater. In an October 1966 memo he urged that ―When you hit upon a tactical,
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operational or maintenance expedient, basically any means of doing the job better, let us
know so we can get the word out to others.‖230
Airmobility as a whole benefited from not only the charismatic personas of
leaders like Seneff, but also from pilots who provided their experiences to the larger
aviation community. By relying on operational reports and lessons learned, along with
other means of in-country analysis, they ensured a program of continual innovations.
―What is the value of a ‗lessons learned‘ system today?‖ the Army Digest asked in
1966.231 Quite simply ―It acts as the ‗hot line‘ to inform the Department of the Army
which fundamentals must be stressed in training and what refinements in tactics, doctrine,
and equipment are necessary.‖232 The Army‘s reliance on OR-LLs constituted a
formalized method of cognitive thought, allowing helicopter units an official voice for
their ideas and experiences.
Tell Us a War Story: Communicating Innovation through Service Journals
Another key method of relaying techniques and procedures was the circulation of
periodicals among the Army. The most notable examples are the United States Army
Aviation Digest (USAAD) and Army Aviation (AA). Both service journals existed for the
same purpose: to inform the Army Aviation community of notable occurrences. USAAD
originated from Fort Rucker, home to helicopter training, and fell under direct
supervision of the school‘s commandant. While an official Department of the Army
publication, it contained mostly unofficial opinions from its readers. Similarly, AA relied
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upon the same types for readership and as a source of contributing articles.233 Subscribers
were members of the Army Aviation Association of American (AAAA). Not an official
Department of the Army magazine, AA was still the product of individuals intimately
related to, and concerned with, their subject matter. As there was no dedicated aviation
branch until 1983, what appears in the both periodicals are articles and letters from across
the Army.
In order to foster discussion and dissemination of the most relevant matters
concerning airmobility and the Army‘s use of helicopters, these magazines solicited
articles from the aviation community. The majority of contributors were not professional
writers. Their intention was not necessarily to inform a larger readership of the overarching details of what Army Aviation was doing.234 Rather, what they produced was
material meant for a specific readership, informing one another of pertinent specifics
regarding their employment of aircraft. Covering a myriad of topics, throughout the
Vietnam-era there was a dynamic exchange of ideas about the role of the helicopter,
many dealing specifically with its application in Southeast Asia.
In 1968 one contributing writer emphasized the importance of relaying battlefield
experience in USAAD, as he solicited insights among Army Aviation for articles
pertaining to ―tactics, techniques and procedures.‖235 He pointedly observes that the
―principles of war never change, but the tactics, techniques and procedures used in the
conduct of war must constantly be changed, improved and modified to retain optimum
233
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effectiveness.‖236 Previous theories formulated stateside could only carry the Army so
far, he believed. Experiences in Vietnam revolutionized how helicopter units operated,
and their dissemination was crucial to understanding how Army Aviation should modify
their procedures to reflect those lessons. ―Rarely are tactics developed in peacetime,‖ the
writer asserts, ―and none can be judged effective until they have been tested and proven
in battle.‖237
The modification of tactics was not an abrupt process, though. Rather, as he
argues, it occurred continually as the composite of new experiences across multiple
phases of combat, the product of trial and error, success and failure. Therefore, it was
incumbent upon each pilot and every unit commander to ―ensure that his trials, errors,
experiences, and lessons learned are reported so that others may benefit from them and
develop more effective tactics, techniques and procedures.‖238 Of course, military pilots
had long relied upon official training material. Indeed, field manuals, training programs,
and the numerous special texts circulated widely among the aviation community. They
could not be relied upon, however, to detail the entirety of all pilots‘ collective
knowledge. The inherent disadvantage was that the writers of these compendiums
attempted to compile and prepare information from a sometimes limited amount of
official reports. As the writer saw it, those personnel were not ―fountains of all
knowledge; they have no crystal balls; they cannot disseminate information which is not
reported.‖239 Crucially, he further noted, they depended on the same people who made up
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the readership of USAAD, ―the individual on the scene, to provide the much needed
information.‖240
Likewise, Army Aviation requested articles from pilots and crews. In April 1966,
Army Aviation director Colonel Delbert L. Bristol asserted that in order to promote
doctrinal development Army Aviation members should analyze Vietnam‘s many lessons.
―To facilitate this study,‖ Bristol observed, ―there is a great need for ‗writers‘ within our
own ranks who will record their experiences and opinions on every facet of our doctrine
and techniques.‖241 A month later, Brigadier General Robert R. Williams became Army
Aviation‘s director and indicated his satisfaction with the response specific to ongoing
operations in Vietnam, acknowledging that ―I have been terribly pleased to note the
frequency and quality of the many articles now appearing in our aviation-oriented
magazine on the subject of aviation in Vietnam.‖242 The sources were mostly ―our young
aviators,‖ and Williams argued their contributions had various advantages. Not only did
they act as an impulse for memories of those who had already served, but they also
provided priceless advice and observations for those headed to Southeast Asia for their
own tours. Granted, Williams argued, even though ―many of the techniques and
procedures put forth by our young stalwarts do not meet our ‗school-book‘ solutions, they
nevertheless point out that there are many ways to skin the proverbial cat.‖243 Indeed,
many of the articles illustrate the product of battlefield expediencies. They were not
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contrived in the clinical environment of stateside testing which stressed safety and
allowed for little latitude outside of by-the-book solutions, but instead, most writers
proffered ideas formulated in the confusion and tension of actual combat.
USAAD‘s discussions of doctrine and techniques had a wider appeal than just
Army pilots as well. Despite the aviation-specific material, the readership was wide
enough that those throughout the Army took notice of the publication. ―The DIGEST is
your magazine,‖ the editors wrote in 1966, ―and your means of obtaining and trading
information Army-wide.‖244 In September 1968 USAAD set a record distribution at
61,245 copies.245 By 1970 their monthly readership reached 500,000.246 Principal among
those non-rated aviators who followed the USAAD closely were ground troops, who not
only read the magazine but also provided their own ideas on the employment of
helicopters. As the largest beneficiary of the aircraft, those on the ground were in a
position to comment upon techniques and proffer solutions to issues about which aviators
may have not been sufficiently aware. Their propositions were often unique approaches
to the matter of transporting troops, utilizing helicopters for reconnaissance, or command
and control. Along with the appeal the Digest had among ground troops, it also met wide
readership in other military branches.247
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Overall, without the benefit of periodicals it is doubtful Army Aviation could
have communicated ideas between themselves as easily. They provided the necessary
forum for individual aviators to detail not only their own experiences, but to allow for
dissemination of new and potentially impactful suggestions. Army Aviation and United
States Army Aviation Digest were perhaps the two best examples of an unfettered
communication between combat theater and those stateside. Though what article writers
offered could sometimes fall outside the common ―school solution,‖ their contributions
were no less valid for those searching for new methods of executing their assigned
missions. Without their input other aviators would likely have not been as well informed
and the Army‘s development of helicopter warfare would doubtlessly not have been as
dynamic.
Vietnam-Oriented Stateside Training
The third method of relating combat experience was through official training. The
Army Aviation School curriculum was tied intimately to operations in Southeast Asia, as
it was very likely most would receive orders for service there immediately upon
graduation.248 Increasing demand for aviators beginning in 1964 strained the capabilities
of the school to produce enough men to fly the much-needed helicopters. As a result,
pilots received instruction which dispensed with information not pertaining to
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Vietnam.249 Quite literally, ―if training could not be utilized during the tour in Vietnam‖
the pilot was likely to forget the instruction, the material was deemed superfluous, ―and
therefore, was considered not productive.‖250
The Army Aviation School was ever cognizant of the situation in Vietnam and
what they should emphasize to prepare their students for an eventual tour there. As
school commandant, Major General John Tolson visited Vietnam in June 1966. He
commented that during this trip, his second, he was ―anxious to glean any information
which I could take back to the Army Aviation School to better prepare the students for
their service in Vietnam.‖251 Seneff felt that, ―the training in the schools from one end to
the other is pointed toward producing a man tailored for the conditions under which he is
going to have to operate.‖252 Overall, they relied upon experience in-country to keep their
training curriculum relevant and to reflect the extent of battlefield knowledge gained in
the combat theater.
Army rotary-wing training was a two-phase program. Students learned the
rudiments of flight, known as Primary Instruction, at Fort Wolters, Texas. These sixteen
weeks imparted the basic principles of flying a helicopter and required a student complete
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their solo flight without an instructor in order to advance to the next phase. Upon
completion of Primary Instruction and having earned their wings, new pilots reported to
Fort Rucker, Alabama for advanced rotary wing training. It was here that students
received training covering tactics and procedures. It was also where pilots first
accustomed themselves to the ubiquitous Huey – likely the type of aircraft most would
fly in Vietnam.
Any training which pilots received in tactics likely originated from the department
most crucial to collecting and redistributing that knowledge: the Department of Tactics
(DOT). Charged with presenting advanced, intermediate and basic-level instruction in
both organization and tactical employment, they also evaluated and coordinated subjects
relating to ―proposed Army aviation material requirements, doctrine, training,
organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures.‖253 Responsible for classroom and
flight instruction, their curriculum was geared towards the one contingency of Vietnam.
Indeed, the war-era Rucker did not resemble its pre-war image. By 1967 ―One of the
greatest changes,‖ noted a colonel, ―is within the Department of Tactics. All instruction is
Vietnam-oriented in the most realistic manner possible to parallel the situation the new
aviator will encounter in Vietnam.‖254 Officially, the DOT‘s principal focus was ―RVN
[Republic of Vietnam] oriented and missions, procedures, and techniques as realistically
toned to that area as possible.‖255
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When not flying, students received classroom instruction which dealt directly
with scenarios they would likely encounter in-country. Training material described
potential situations in detail. The Department of Tactics undertook continual reviews of
their classroom instruction to guarantee the relevancy of Vietnam-oriented
information.256 Proposed tactical situations utilized actual maps of Vietnam, depicting the
terrain and villages of certain areas as they existed in reality. Though the scenarios
presented to students were fictitious and did not necessarily mirror that area‘s situation at
the time, they were representative of what could likely occur.257 Realistic portrayals such
as these were not simply theoretical problems, but operations which occurred on a daily
basis in Vietnam. Familiarization with the chain of command, who controlled given
portions of missions, correct procedures in various situations, and potentially suitable
landing zones all reflected what previous experience in-country deemed crucial
knowledge.
Training emphasized familiarity with Vietnam on multiple levels. During the war,
the Aviation School renamed parts of Fort Rucker, along with surrounding areas leased
by the Army, to reflect the various names of Vietnamese cities and provinces.258
Beginning in 1966, during the last week of instruction at Rucker, students executed
missions at Tac-X, the tactical training site.259 Attempting to familiarize further the new
aviators with what they would soon be experiencing in RVN, students flew simulated
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combat missions, living in the field throughout the week.260 The emphasis during this
period was on combat realism and during the fourteen day exercise students flew typical
Vietnam-type missions without instructors on-board.
This last phase was ―constantly changing to keep abreast of the needs. Realism
and practicality are keynotes, and reports from commanders in Vietnam indicate the
school has been able to maintain the flexibility needed.‖261 Tolson intended the last week
to make up for the lack of unit training, as most pilots deployed as individuals rather than
in a unit. The emphasis was on incorporating ―as much combat realism as possible to
facilitate the essential transformation from ‗student‘ to ‗pilot‘.‖262 Above all, it was an
attempt to offer students a greater understanding of what the near future had in store for
them. Indeed, much of what the instructors covered throughout the final week were
methods and techniques which would be of daily use in Vietnam. Pilots also related
techniques stateside to other aviators through personal instruction. Many who completed
their year-long tour in Vietnam rotated to Fort Rucker as instructors, bringing with them
the newest and most relevant information about tactics and procedures. Already by early
1966 Brigadier General Seneff noted that more than 500 veterans of RVN had become
faculty members at the aviation schools.263 Upon arrival they underwent debriefing ―in an
attempt to glean information with which to improve its instruction.‖264 Seneff encouraged
those brigade members headed to Fort Rucker to ―strive to share their experience here
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with the instructors and students at the Aviation School.‖265 Aviation director Brigadier
General Williams felt comfort knowing that with ―the wealth of experience available in
the Vietnam returnees at our Aviation Schools, I know that our recent and future
graduates will be the best qualified for Vietnam duty that time and experience can
give.‖266
William Meacham, a pilot with the 101st Aviation Battalion, asserts that most
instructor pilots had already served at least one tour in Southeast Asia, and ―were
dedicated and professional aviators.‖267 Veterans‘ knowledge of what was important in
combat could serve the student well. Meacham believed it was advantageous if the
instructor departed from the written lesson plan and taught techniques not officially
sanctioned. This deviation from the ―school solution‖ was beneficial for most students
who were looking to gain as much knowledge about their impending tour in Vietnam as
possible. What worked in the eyes of the safety-conscience school could often differ from
what battlefield expediencies had taught was a more viable approach. ―In combat,‖
Meacham argues, ―there was no such thing as a ‗school solution‘.‖268
Lower-grade pilots were not the only recipients of the Army Aviation‘s lesson
learned or the benefactors of personal instruction from Vietnam veterans. By the
beginning of 1966 the Army decided senior field grade aviators bound for Vietnam
needed proper orientation in the procedures of ongoing operations. From this
determination came the Army Aviation Commanders Vietnam Orientation Course
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(AACVOC).269 The first class began in November 1966 at Fort Rucker.270 Course
participants were rated aviators in an aviation command or staff position bound for
Vietnam. AACVOC reflected the most current information coming out of Southeast Asia,
combining both the official lessons learned gleaned via official channels, and the
experiences of returned veterans. Whereas the Army Aviation School intended most of
their instruction to train individual aviators for their impending tours in Vietnam, the
Orientation Course dealt specifically with the planning and support aspects of airmobile
operations. Just as the young pilots operating in Vietnam needed to be well versed in the
structure of Army operations, their commanders required an equal or better understanding
of these aspects.
Overall, the Army Aviation Schools at Fort Wolters, Fort Rucker, and other
ancillary facilities were directly linked to the war in Vietnam. The growing importance of
helicopters to the Army‘s efforts in Southeast Asia meant that a focused, accelerated, and
efficient program of instruction benefited students bound for the combat zone. A close
relationship between aviation units in-country and stateside training institutions
illustrated not only the Army‘s realization that the past informed the future, but that
efficiency and safety could best be taught through hard-learned lessons. Through a
specific Vietnam-oriented school curriculum, the wisdom offered by RVN returnees, and
orientation of command aviation personnel from experienced pilots, the Army insured
that battlefield knowledge would have a larger doctrine-serving purpose.
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Yet, it might have been unrealistic to think the Army Aviation School could
prepare every student to operate in Vietnam immediately upon their arrival. As one
Department of Tactics instructor noted in 1969, it was perhaps impossible to meet such
ambitious combat readiness. The schools could offer a Vietnam-oriented training
curriculum, one that dealt with realism and put a premium on the current situation in the
combat theater, but not every student would be immediately operation-ready. He
correctly notes that most units in Vietnam fought their own war with specific techniques
to fulfill certain mission objectives. ―Therefore,‖ he asserts, ―‗immediate employment‘
would demand as many flight schools as there are aviation units in Vietnam.‖271 That
being an unrealistic expectation, ―the Army compromises by averaging out these various
techniques and methods and comes up with a training program which they hope will
make the new aviator qualified to transition into the various aviation units in Vietnam in
a minimum amount of time.‖272 Though their training was as specific as generality would
allow, the individual aviator relied a great deal on in-country indoctrination to refine the
methods and techniques he would employ throughout his tour.
Learning on the Job: In-Country Orientation
The final method of relating experience in helicopter warfare was through actual
combat instruction. In the early years of large-scale American presence in Vietnam, entire
units such as the 1st Cavalry Division arrived in-country requiring orientation to become
operational quickly. Units which had operated in Southeast Asia provided a training
program by allowing the new pilots to fly as copilots during combat missions, offering

271

Captain Roger P. Kalinger, Letter to United States Army Aviation Digest, USAAD, Vol. 15, No. 2
(February 1969), 1
272

Ibid.

103
the somewhat insulated environment of flying with veterans.273 As the war progressed,
however, units remained in-country and a flow of individual aviators rotated in and out.
The majority of helicopter pilots arrived in Southeast Asia this way, as individual
replacements. This practice of rotation required a method of receiving and orientating
new pilots quickly.
Upon arriving at their unit in Vietnam, replacements underwent a calculated
period of in-country training as copilots. Flying alongside veterans as a copilot, or ―peter
pilot‖, for a period of months allowed them to refine their methods.274 The ―aircraft
commander‖ – a term used to denote a combat veteran, usually with three or more
months in Vietnam and the primary pilot of a helicopter – was intended to impart tactical
and general wisdom regarding operations and other aspects of sorties. What resulted were
pilot-to-pilot tutorials designed to confer the skills which best prepared an aviator to
complete missions not only successfully, but to keep themselves and their crews alive.
Such communication of insight was crucial for the mostly inexperienced pilots deployed
to RVN for the first time.275
Armed only with simulated combat flying during flight school, the realities of
Vietnam were far removed from stateside preparation. One assault helicopter pilot
asserted that ―Vietnam is the school after school.‖276 James Joyce joined the 227th Assault
Helicopter Battalion in 1966 and relates that his mentor ―had me doing things with the
Huey that I had no idea I, or the Huey, could do.‖ Indeed, inexperience was a hazard for
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all, and Joyce was fortunate that through exposure ―to intensive instruction Captain Paul
Silberberger made me a Huey pilot.‖277 25th Aviation Battalion pilot Joseph Finch, noted
that upon deploying to Vietnam ―I was soon to find out Flight School barely qualified me
to fly in a safe area. Learning the skills I would need to survive a year in Vietnam had
just begun.‖278 Without assistance offered by experienced pilots – even fundamental
instruction – it is likely new aviators would not have adapted to combat as quickly.
Most importantly, veterans could teach lessons with regard to their particular area
of operation. The lack of standardized techniques across Vietnam obliged a large degree
of localized orientation. Variables in terrain and operational methods meant there was an
inherent difficulty in interchanging pilots or units from one area to the next.279 Few
people knew the intricacies of daily operations in particular areas better than the pilots
who developed specialized adjustments which worked best there. No matter their rank or
amount of flight experience, all new pilots had to undergo this period of transition. Such
instruction paid large dividends when it was time for the recipients themselves to pass
down the skills they learned only months prior.
Some methods could vary from aviator to aviator depending on their own abilities
and the instructions they had received from their own mentors.280 As one pilot relates,
those new in-country had to absorb large amounts of information from multiple mentors.
Each brought their own prejudices and beliefs about what worked best in given situations,
but he warns that ―Because one man got burned during a certain maneuver does not rule
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out the use of that maneuver forever.‖281 Conversely, he argues, just because something
proved successful at one point did not qualify that procedure as the only correct method.
Stereotyped thinking was inherently dangerous in combat situations with their many
variables. Ultimately, the pilot advises that ―A new aviator will have to listen to a lot of
advice based on a lot of experience. He should listen – then adopt that which makes most
sense to him.‖282 Training and orientation for those beginning their tours was often an
intense period of instruction, requiring them to assimilate the styles and techniques of
multiple aircraft commanders until they devised their own specific procedures.
Time constraints and a general belief that combat was the ultimate training
ground meant most units openly endorsed on the job training (OJT). Within months of
their formation, the 1st Aviation Brigade set up a formalized method of training,
expecting their pilots to know the capabilities and procedures of the unit‘s aircraft and
then conducting additional mentoring to solve any deficiencies. At that time they flew as
a copilot for up to twenty-five flight hours during administrative missions. Only then
were they allowed to fly as a copilot during combat missions, hopefully exhibiting
enough proficiency that they could eventually be recommended to become an aircraft
commander. As Seneff saw it, the notable benefit of this system was that it ―provides us
with sound, and well qualified aviators to fly our combat missions. This approach does,
in fact, combine training with mission accomplishment, and does ensure that our best
qualified aviators are filling the right [pilot‘s] seat.‖283 Progressively allowing greater

281

Captain Patrick H. Brady, ―Solo Missions,‖ USAAD, Vol. 12, No. 7 (July 1966), 6.

282

Ibid.

283

Department of the Army, Headquarters USA Aviation Brigade (Provisional), ―Commander‘s Notes,
Number 3‖ (13 May 1966), p. 1, Aviation Box 9, Folder 3, George P. Seneff Papers, USAMHI.

106
responsibility solved the requirement of training and indoctrination while simultaneously
allowing pilots to become comfortable with their own level of proficiency.
While the Army‘s aviation school provided the basic skills necessary, aviators
still required in-country experience before they were ready to become aircraft
commanders. Without the advanced training received from veterans and the experience of
flying combat missions, Army Aviation could not have so capably imparted newly
devised tactics or procedures. Localized orientation was key to maintaining and passing
down the combat experience of others – much of which might have never made it into the
official field manuals, been part of the school curriculum, or made into the pages of
service periodicals.
Keeping the Wolf from the Door: Rotation and the Pilot Vacuum
Army Aviation‘s varied methods of communicating information was ever-more
important because of the large amount of new pilots they had to field. As American
troop-levels increased in Vietnam and U.S. forces undertook larger operations, assault
helicopters took on a more pronounced role. Army Aviation was initially not prepared to
provide so many aircraft and pilots, and only through marked growth of the training
programs and organization could they expect to answer the call. Few among them viewed
this as a negative turn of events, but the demand overwhelmed their ranks, necessitating
sacrifices from pilots and marking a period of dramatic change. Though the war
necessitated continual expansions of training outputs, the year-long deployment cycle
continued to become a central issue for Army Aviation.
The 1st Cavalry Division was the first large aviation unit to feel the effects of the
year-long tour of duty system. Once the pride of Army Aviation, their exceptional

107
performance throughout 1965 was due largely to the experience which pilots carried over
from stateside training. Indeed, most of the aviators initially assigned to the 1st Cav were
veterans of the 11th Air Assault tests, comfortable with the tactics and well-acquainted
with their fellow pilots. In late 1966 their immense amount of experience quickly
dissipated as pilots rotated out of Vietnam. A nearly mass exodus due to their
simultaneous arrival in-country a year earlier created an experience gap.284 ―Without
casting aspersions of any sort on the new personnel,‖ Retired General Hamilton Howze
averred, ―the division, still a fine one, has thus been caused to be closer in experience and
training in airmobility to other forces in Vietnam.‖285 Turnover further hurt the Army in
these early years because so few initially had much experience with airmobility.
Personnel who rotated through Vietnam gained knowledge about airmobile operations
mostly through combat exposure, but that theater was the sole provider of certain lessons.
While the Army struggled to provide units in-country with replacements, those
returning from Vietnam likely faced a rotation back to RVN. By 1966 the Army realized
the conclusive need for multiple tours. Then Director of Army Aviation, Colonel Delbert
L. Bristol, observed that their role had become so important ―that many of our Aviation
personnel, particularly Army Aviators, will of necessity have to repeat tours in that area
in order to insure that our U.S. combat operations are properly supported.‖286 In June of
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that year pilots could expect only nine months to a year out of Vietnam before a second
deployment there; throughout the war the Army tried to maintain a minimum of twelve
months between tours.287 ―Still,‖ Brigadier General Williams quipped, ―a fourth grader
can tell you very quickly that if you have 10,000 aviators and 5,000 are in Vietnam, then
one year in and one year out is the best you can do.‖288 Vietnam took on priority status
for the Army‘s worldwide inventory levels. The funnel of pilots to Vietnam downsized
the personnel levels elsewhere in the world.289 The rate at which the Army demanded
additional pilots quickly outstripped the training schools‘ ability to provide them.
Consequently, they looked towards their rated-aviators to take up the slack. As a means
of providing personnel, the Department of the Army temporarily eliminated ground duty
tours for rated pilots under the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
Career-minded aviators felt the pressure of the situation after suspension of their
attendance at branch career schools. Furthermore, some aviators found their retirements,
non-active duty requests, and resignations denied.290 Student petitions for removal from
the aviation program met with almost universal denial from the school, unless in proven
cases involving ―cowardice, refusal to fly, fear of flying, and flagrant violation of flying
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regulations.‖291 Demand for replacements also modified short-tour deployment
restrictions. Pilots could receive orders to Vietnam as individual replacements with as
little as six months left of obligated service in the Army, or to a unit with only three
months remaining.292 Since all qualified pilots from the grade of major on down filled
cockpit positions, it stocked units with unusually high-ranking aviators.293 Out of
necessity they put their careers on hold, all the while feeling as if they were ―second class
citizens,‖ and harboring doubts about the future of their careers.294
Such demands on pilots and their families caused a detrimental effect on the
retention of career aviators.295 The Army understood that their reliance upon experienced
pilots put added stress on marriages and careers, but quick alternatives were few and far
between. Brigadier General Williams appealed to the aviation community in mid-1966,
asking ―each of you to shoulder the burden that has fallen your lot and perform your
duties in the best manner possible. Talk to your families of the necessity for sacrifice in
this critical period of our history and stay with the aviation program and the Army if you
possibly can.‖296 During his tenure as Director of Army Aviation, Colonel Bristol
realized that due to long separation from their loved ones, ―hardships are ahead for many
of our aviation families.‖297 Still, he assured them that ―we are and will continue to take
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all measures possible to minimize the hardships involved.‖298 Along with family
concerns, officers attempting to continue along the conventional career track worried that
multiple tours in RVN would necessitate their absence from branch schooling.
Their concern was certainly valid, enough so that in 1966 the Army‘s Chief of
Staff ordered Major General Delk Oden, Director of Officer Personnel, to draft a letter
for inclusion in the personnel file of every aviator under the grade of Lieutenant
Colonel.299 Oden‘s letter explained to those who might consider the individual for
promotion or schooling why that person may have not have had the customarily required
assignments or training. The Army hoped the letter would direct ―each evaluating
individual to recognize the turbulence in aviator careers, and the reasons for creating this
turbulence . . . .‖300
In personal correspondence with Brigadier General Seneff in November 1966,
Oden reflected on the situation: ―With the present replacement cycle it has become
almost impossible to manage our aviators‘ careers. We are constantly searching for some
way to improve this situation to prevent our commissioned aviators from falling behind
their non-rated contemporaries careerwise [sic].‖301 The strain felt by Army Aviation was
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of concern to many, and as the commanding officer of the 1st Aviation Brigade, Seneff
knew well the demands of Vietnam and the likelihood of a continued buildup, further
complicating the matter. He replied that the ―aviator career problem is near and dear to all
of us. We can‘t keep the wolf from the door indefinitely, and I‘m sure our youngsters are
really going to feel the pinch in this area in the next year – even worse than the past.‖302
His solution was one which appealed to most, but did not gain traction throughout
the Vietnam War. ―Do you suppose it would be the appropriate time,‖ Seneff asked, ―to
again bring up the subject of a separate Aviation Branch?‖303 Some considered such a
suggestion to be a valid reaction. The aviator attempting to control his career could often
feel caught between two powerful forces: Army Aviation demanding his continued and
comprehensive role as a pilot, and fulfilling duties corresponding to his primary branch,
be they schooling or ground duty deemed to be essential for a ―professional, well
rounded, experienced officer.‖304 As one pilot asked rhetorically in 1966, ―Must the
Army Aviator continue to split his capabilities? Can he devote 100 percent of his time to
aviation for extended periods – perhaps three years or more – and then be expected to be
and to remain an effective branch-qualified officer?‖305 Attempts to better the state of
affairs, to repair the detriments created by the growing need for helicopter pilots, still
provided little consolation for those facing multiple tours in Vietnam.
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Despite attempts to convince aviators that their career possibilities outweighed the
strenuous demands placed upon them, morale suffered. Quite realistically the Army
claimed that airmobility would continue growing in size and emphasis. Regardless of the
career turbulence, it offered them the ability to stand out amongst their peers. Those who
exhibited ―practical knowledge in the many facets of air mobility, who‘s blessed with
common sense and an attitude of wanting to really perform and get ahead, cannot be held
down.‖306 Although it was true airmobility was growing at a rapid pace, it did little to
lessen the sacrifices demanded of the pilot corps. With morale sinking noticeably by early
1966, attempts at buoying confidence in their career choice may have seemed like hollow
reassurance. Being a part of Army Aviation was quickly becoming a fate to be avoided.
Seneff wrote in late 1965 that through his conversations with numerous young
aviators he was made aware of the dispirited atmosphere among a number of pilots,
causing many to leave the Army. ―People simply get fed up with the TDY [temporary
duty], the tours in undesirable areas, and the hours put in on proving new concepts in
airmobile units.‖307 The reaction among most, Seneff continued, was to ask what they
were getting in return for their efforts. He argued the answer was simple, if not obvious.
Among the more lofty outcomes, they were ―making the name Army Aviator a respected
term both in and out of the service.‖308 Additionally, they were assisting their country in a
time of need, along with learning a specific skill set to which others in the Army did not
have access. In the purely military realm, though, he estimated that they were ―helping to
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set a pattern for the future that could considerably change the organization of the United
States Army and the nature of ground combat.‖309 While the majority of young pilots
may not have viewed their efforts in such a grandiloquent manner, any affirmation that
their struggles were not going overlooked went a long way.
Warrant Officers
Measures intended to salvage a pilot‘s career at first only extended to
commissioned officers. Warrant officers, an essential element of Army Aviation, often
felt the most maligned. They received no special letter in their file explaining the
extenuating circumstances of Vietnam, nor did they earn the same pay or career benefits
as their commissioned comrades. On the issue of retention, warrant officers simply felt
less compelled to extend their careers in the Army, as it mostly guaranteed extensive
work and sacrifice. The Army‘s intention for the warrant officer to be a ―professional
aviator, one who devotes all his time to aviation‖ meant a great deal of Vietnam‘s stress
fell upon them. By 1967 ninety-eight percent of warrant officers were either in Vietnam
at the time or had already served a tour there.310 Though the rank appealed to some –
mainly younger pilots who wished only to fly rather than cultivate a career with the
attendant responsibilities, training, and expectations – the traditional warrant officers
could sometimes feel slighted by such divergent career paths, and a lack of opportunities
regardless of the comparable work load and performance.
One pilot noted that the Army relied almost entirely upon warrants to instruct in
the aviation schools, to instill the type of professional abilities and attitudes expected of
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the grade.311 ―This is the only profession I‘m aware of,‖ he wrote, ―in which the teachers
make less professional pay (flight pay) than their students (commissioned types).‖ 312 A
sense of alienation, of second citizenship, could also mar any feelings of cohesion,
because, as in the writer‘s own experience, ―I begin to wonder about my professional
status when the Colonel begins his little talks not with a greeting to his aviators, but
rather to ‗officers and warrant officers.‘‖313
The Army‘s dependence on the warrant officer was certainly never in question.
Already by 1962 Army Aviation was made aware of the necessity of warrant officers by
the Howze Board, which called for a one to one ratio of warrant officers to commissioned
officers by 1967.314 Intended solely as pilots, their careers existed distinct from
commissioned officers in that they were not burdened by matters of leadership. The
warrant was a ―skilled technician who is provided to fill those positions above the
enlisted level which are too specialized in scope to permit the effective development and
continued utilization of a broadly trained, branch-qualified commissioned officer,‖ not a
leader of men.315 As Major General Williams explained it, in Army Aviation ―the warrant
officer is the ‗Master Craftsman‘ who will spend a full military career flying aircraft. On
the other hand, the commissioned aviator is assigned to positions that require the exercise
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of command or require knowledge and decisions regarding tactical or technical
operations for which only the commissioned officer is trained.‖316 For those warrant
officers concerned about their careers, there were attempts to placate them. Beginning in
November 1967 the Army reduced the time in service required for promotion from
warrant officer to chief warrant officer from eighteen to twelve months.317
Still, not all warrant officers wished to make a career of the Army. Any qualms
they may have had about the effect of Vietnam upon a potential career were of little
consequence, considering their main motivation was to fly. Without this enthusiasm to
fill a limited role, the Army was likely not to meet the personnel quota. In 1966 the Army
expanded their Warrant Officer Candidate program, hoping to entice men from the
regular army and civilians to become pilots. ―Aviators are needed,‖ the Army Digest
declared. ―Never before in Army history has air mobility been as important or as
extensive as it is in the Republic of Vietnam, where our aviators are daily providing vital
support to our foot soldiers.‖318 The training required four weeks of ―officer candidate
school-type instruction,‖ whereupon the newly minted warrant officers attended the
normalized thirty-two week aviation program at Forts Wolters and Rucker.319
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The seemingly obvious solution to remedy the lack of pilots was simply to
increase class sizes coming through the Army‘s aviation schools. In June 1966 the
Department of the Army predicted that future battlefield needs required over 14,000
pilots by year‘s end. Compared to the projected strength of only 9,700, the serious
shortfall revealed a dire situation. Projections into and throughout 1967 recorded the
requirement at around 21,500 pilots while the Army would have only 12,800 available.320
Despite the strides Army Aviation made throughout the early 1960s in capabilities and
doctrine, without the adequate numbers of aviators those in charge believed that
airmobility could possibly falter in Vietnam. Secretary of Defense McNamara authorized
the Army to increase their overall pilot training output from 120 a month to 425.321 Even
if the aviation schools were able to quickly satisfy such a marked increase in output, they
would not see the benefits of larger class sizes soon – it required a ―lead time‖ of fifteen
to eighteen months to ―recruit, train and deploy aviators‖ after authorizing increased
training outputs.322
Over the course of fiscal year 1966, Fort Rucker‘s class sizes ballooned from 96 a
month to 375.323 Yet, before the school could meet the goal of 425 students a month the
demand increased again. In December 1966 the Army approved yet another training
increase to 625 pilots a month, requiring an expansion of the facilities at Fort Stewart,
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Georgia, a number not hit until mid-1968.324 Fort Rucker continued to meet the demand
for more pilots in 1968, graduating over 4,500 new Army aviators, and qualifying or
transitioning another 1,649 into rotary wing aircraft.325
With the large numbers of new aviators entering the ranks, it was even more
important the Army maintained the methods of communicating techniques and
procedures. Training prepared them for the rudiments of combat flying, but as some had
differentiated, there needed to be a transition from student to pilot. To keep up with the
incessant need for more pilots the Army expanded the Primary Helicopter Center at Fort
Wolters, Texas in 1968.326 Designed solely in response to Vietnam and the personnel
issue, the 160 acre installation, Dempsey Army Heliport, was part of a $10 million
expansion program at Wolters in order to increase the primary phase‘s output by fifty
percent.327
Demand for more aviators also meant the Army cut down on the amount of time
between graduation and assignment to an operational unit in Vietnam. There would be no
chance to refine what the newly-graduated pilot learned throughout the previous months.
The training they received at Forts Wolters and Rucker therefore had to provide them
324
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with the tools necessary to operate in the combat zone as soon as possible.
Implementation of a new system in July 1965 divided helicopter flight training into two
equal blocks between the two training facilities, both phases taking place over sixteen
weeks each.328 The previous program required a 12/20 split – twelve weeks at Primary
Helicopter School at Fort Wolters and twenty at Fort Rucker – but did not adequately
prepare pilots to fly immediately in Vietnam. Unique demands required the Army
implement a system unlike any other service branch. Indeed, none but the Army sent their
graduates directly to the combat theater without additional specialized training.
To an extent the Army Aviation training schools could only provide so many
rated aviators per training cycle while still imparting upon them the necessary skills to
survive and operate effectively in combat. Airmobility, merely a controversial concept
one decade before, was maturing into an essential asset for the U.S. Army, one who had
become reliant, if not expectant, on the enhanced mobility. Yet, despite this increasing
need for helicopters, Army Aviation was not fully prepared to meet the demand.
Although high-ranking officers such as Hamilton Howze had years before predicted the
need for more personnel, the suggested levels never met the realistic ones.
Conclusion
The communication and dissemination of tactical and procedural innovations
during the Vietnam War was crucial for varied reasons, first being the relative youth of
Army Aviation. Despite much pre-Vietnam theorizing regarding the use of airmobility,
Vietnam was a different environment than what their tests had focused upon. The Army
could have relied solely upon their prior studies and tests to guide them through Vietnam
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– the aviation community might have simply argued their doctrine needed no additional
refinement. Instead, they approached their role and mission with somewhat of an open
mind, understanding that the lack of a historical precedent of helicopters in
counterinsurgency required flexibility. Combat had proven some prior ideas as sound, but
others in need of modification, and that needed a mechanism to properly relay these
insights. Airmobility, therefore, relied heavily upon young pilots to determine what
methods would act as its framework.
Additionally, the Army needed a means to collect and relay battlefield knowledge
because of the large amount of pilots they had to train. An increased demand for aviators
meant relative neophytes to aviation received less than a year of training before flying
combat missions. Unless the Army had a means of collecting important battlefield
knowledge and programming it into their curriculum, the new pilot would be a liability.
Unlike other service branches where potential aviators underwent rigorous and extensive
training before qualifying to fly in combat, the overwhelming need for helicopters meant
there would be no such luxury for the rotary-wing pilot. Twelve month tours in Vietnam
also required the helicopter unit to make their new aviators operationally capable in the
least amount of time as possible. Thus, in-country orientation alongside veteran pilots
became a key period of apprenticeship before becoming an aircraft commander.
During the early- to mid-1960s Army Aviation was just getting by. Fearing a
crippling lack of personnel for Vietnam, they attempted to retain as many pilots as they
could. The sacrifices demanded of helicopter pilots put stress upon families and
professional ambitions, forcing an unsettling rate of aviators leaving the service. Not only
did they lose able-bodied men, but more worrisome, they lost the experience these pilots
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took with them. The Army was not immediately willing, or able, to allow their pilots time
away from aviation, let alone indulge those concerned about time-intensive career
development. Keeping the ―wolf from the door‖ as George Seneff put it, placed a
tremendous strain on the capabilities of Army Aviation to supply the required number of
pilots while simultaneously looking after their career development. Yet, to their credit,
the Army did make attempts to look after the pilots from whom they asked so much. As a
result, they committed to reforms, fighting both to alleviate constraints upon officers‘
schooling and assignments, and undertaking a concerted review in 1966 of the warrant
officer career outlook. A healthy campaign of platitudes advocating the benefits of an
exciting future for Army Aviation may not have completely solved the morale issue, but
there was some truth to what they argued. Helicopter crews were pushing the boundaries
of modern warfare, and along the way they were refining skill sets not commonly
prevalent. For the young pilot who just wanted to fly, though, all the encouragement they
needed was the promise of excitement and challenge. Vietnam, to be sure, offered ample
amounts of each.
Army Aviation‘s relative youth during the Vietnam War could have possibly
proven detrimental. Unlike other branches who entered the war with concrete doctrinal
perspective born from decades of prior theorizing and experience, the booming aviation
program underwent rapid testing in combat. Despite this seeming handicap, they met the
challenge of an insurgency with an embryonic heli-borne concept. Aiding that success
was their ability to communicate combat experience through multiple channels. This
allowed not only a free exchange of ideas to better tactics and procedures, but ensured
that pilots felt their contributions were valued. The history of assault helicopters in
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Vietnam is a study in doctrinal development through combat experience. It illustrates
how militaries learn, disseminate, and react to warfare when employing a developing
capability. Without official reports, service journals, selective school curriculum, and incountry training, it is doubtful the Army‘s assault helicopter units could have innovated
as quickly as they did. Their ability to collect and synthesize theories, insights, and
experience meant that, just as the Army Aviation motto attests, they were above the best.

CONCLUSION
If one looks no further than the extant literature, it would be easy to believe that
the United States Army‘s use of assault helicopters during the Vietnam War saw their
only real test during the Battle of Ia Drang, and from then on enjoyed formulaic
employment. Indeed, the historical record seemingly does not appreciate the effort put
forth by Army Aviation after 1965, other than developments in attack helicopter design
and employment. The experience of the 1st Cavalry Division in November of that year
was only the start of a continual process of innovation and refinements of tactics and
procedures amongst assault helicopter units. The formation of the 1st Aviation Brigade in
1966 signaled the Army‘s growing dependence on rotary wing aircraft. Non-organic
helicopters augmented the already attached divisional units, giving all infantry commands
a degree of mobility which previously only the airmobile division enjoyed.
These actions were not the sudden outcome of an unforeseen requirement,
however. To understand how far Army Aviation came in a short time one must appreciate
that the previous fifteen years set the stage for the eventual helicopter-dependent Army.
Forward-thinking individuals had for some time envisioned what came to fruition in
Southeast Asia. Even though the effort to create a capable aviation force at the behest of
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara related to a European battlefield, it created a
foundation for the heli-borne concept employed in the brush-fire war of Vietnam.
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A perceived emergency need twice resulted in the quick arrival of helicopter
forces in Vietnam – in 1961 and again in 1965. An eventually ingrained usefulness kept
them there. When called upon to render assistance, the Army turned to helicopters to
provide crucial mobility. The ramifications of that decision impacted Army Aviation for
the rest of the war, and even beyond. For the division‘s seeming victory in November
1965 convinced decision makers in the Pentagon and elsewhere that reliance on
helicopters could lead to the successful prosecution of the growing war. In that way, Ia
Drang is only the beginning of the story. It merely allowed for the developments which
came later, for the meteoric growth of Army Aviation.329
The increase in rotary-wing aircraft usage gave rise to the careers of those who
championed airmobility from its early days. Proponents of the concept took important
and influential positions during the war and after. Widespread use of helicopters
propelled visionaries like Hamilton H. Howze, Harry W.O. Kinnard, Delk M. Oden,
George P. Seneff, Jr., Robert M. Williams, George W. Putnam, Jr., Allen M. Burdett, Jr.,
James H. Merryman, and John J. Tolson, among others, to positions of considerable
influence as they guided the Army‘s aviation program through a period of extraordinary
transition. Their leadership guarantees mention in any extensive study of the topic, as
their influence on airmobility put an indelible mark on organization, training, and
doctrine.
In a little over a decade the Army‘s helicopter force emerged from interservice
struggles with the Air Force to become an acknowledged and appreciated organization.
One of the positives which arose from a war laden with negatives was the bolstering
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effect it had upon Army Aviation. In Vietnam those associated with helicopters could
finally boast that the Army depended upon them, that they had become an essential
element of the modern military. The strategy of attrition around which the United States
military based their entire approach in Southeast Asia relied as heavily upon the mobility
of helicopters as any other technological asset. That is not to say that they constituted the
sine qua non of the entire American effort in the theater, but their contributions cannot be
overvalued. Assault helicopter units carried troops to and from the battlefield, provided
crucial logistical support, and fulfilled virtually any other sundry task which required the
movement of personnel and material.
Though some will continue to argue that the Army was foolish to fight an
insurgency in the manner they did, their use of helicopters as a counterinsurgent tool was
largely a product of the Cold War. The United States military found themselves forced to
―anticipate the requirement to fight anywhere,‖ as Hamilton Howze argued.330 ―No other
nation,‖ he believed, ―not even the USSR, faces so broad a requirement for flexibility of
application.‖331 As a result, the Army‘s structure did not correspond to fighting in any
one particular environment, and as such it was ―imperfectly organized to cope with any
of them.‖332 Historian Ingo Trauschweizer argues that the Cold War Army, rather than
focusing on many potential areas of conflict, committed to one. Realizing the
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impracticality of general-purpose forces, he asserts, the Army primarily aimed to prepare
for a European war.333
Army Aviation found themselves providing an all-contingency posture throughout
their formative years in the 1950s and early 1960s with a European-designed force.
Nothing illustrated it better than when their helicopters deployed in 1961 against
guerrillas, while concurrent stateside airmobility tests focused extensively for European
war. This seeming contradiction in purpose was illustrative of a Cold War necessity,
which was to an extent a Faustian bargain. It meant chancing that Europe would remain
the most important threat, at the cost of not having a dedicated organization to respond
elsewhere. Administration officials believed that military forces meant to fight a
sophisticated enemy could easily take on one less complex.334 Thus, Army helicopters
became among the first American units to arrive in Southeast Asia. In the main, Army
Aviation was flexible enough, especially at this early stage, to willingly conform to
counterinsurgency. It was a prudent decision, as there were few actual alternatives.
As the war progressed, demands for men and equipment overstressed the
capabilities of their providers. Army rotary wing pilot training underwent radical
expansions to supply enough aviators quickly. Along with the necessary men, the effort
also required boosts in the numbers of equipment. Bell, the manufacturer of the aircraft
upon which assault helicopter units relied most, the UH-1, only produced thirty per
month during mid-1964. By 1967, in direct response to the Army‘s needs in Southeast
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Asia, they raised their production to 150 per month.335 Ultimately, rotary-wing aircraft
marked the beginning and end of large-scale U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Army
transportation companies, organizational predecessors to assault helicopter companies,
were among the first units to arrive in-country. The heart-wrenching closing images of
the American experience in Southeast Asia also feature the ubiquitous helicopter,
ferrying desperate crowds from Saigon‘s rooftops in front of an indefatigable North
Vietnamese advance.
The story of Army Aviation in the years following Vietnam finds a lingering
legacy of their experience there. While true that the war formed them into a capable
force, the resultant lessons did not find potential applicability in multiple environments –
not everything assault helicopter units learned there translated into carbon-copy usage
elsewhere. Southeast Asia, with its mostly low-intensity warfare, was a suitable starting
point for utilizing helicopters in modern combat, but some still harbored doubts about
rotary-wing aircraft‘s usefulness in more sophisticated environments. Vietnam had
demanded much of the Army‘s attention throughout the 1960s, but the specter of Europe
still loomed. With draw-downs of American forces in Southeast Asia beginning under
President Richard Nixon‘s Vietnamization program, some in the aviation community
began focusing their attention back on the European question. By 1973, with the final
American combat soldier leaving Southeast Asia, many Army aviators were looking far
beyond that war, seeing it as confined already to the history books – some might say in an
attempt to forget the experience altogether.
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Without doubt, the war had taken a toll on the Army‘s ability to prepare for the
more menacing scenario of a large-scale war in Europe. While the U.S. military slogged
through the rice paddies, slashed through jungles, and plodded over the mountains of
Vietnam, the Soviet Union continually built up their military. By war‘s end, Warsaw Pact
countries could bring to bear more sophisticated conventional, not to mention nuclear,
weaponry than the Army was used to fighting. The U.S. Army emerged as a whole from
Southeast Asia realizing that they were outmatched in the requisite men and equipment to
fight a possible European war. Too fatigued and jaded by Vietnam, the American public
was likely not to support a continued high-budget military. Yet, in order to face potential
threats, the Army could not simply downsize their inventory and personnel in a fashion as
quickly as prior wars. Into this reality, Army Aviation emerged from a decade of
counterinsurgent struggle, grasping to determine what applicability the experience had
towards future conflicts.
Not surprisingly, in the early 1970s they looked more forward than they did
backward. Gone from the pages of many service journals was analysis of
counterinsurgency, replaced instead by discussions of conventional war.336 Visionaries
posited that to remain a viable force required a new posture, one which stressed Europe
as the primary field of battle and doctrine which broke the ―bad habits‖ of Vietnam.
Reflecting on the future, Army Aviation asked where they fit into the reworked
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European-focused doctrine, with an emphasis on mechanized warfare over the infantryheavy Vietnam structure. The 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East provided the
U.S. Army valuable insight into war against a heavily mechanized Soviet-equipped force.
In many ways it provided an impetus for Army Aviation planners to adapt quickly their
tactics and procedures. That war ―clearly announced the arrival of a new spectrum of
Soviet weapons,‖ which would become ―particularly challenging to aviation
operations.‖337 Tactical analysis of mid-intensity war continued throughout the decade, as
the military‘s desire to fight another low-intensity Third World counterinsurgency had
nearly totally abated.
In a way, Army Aviation arrived full circle, back again where Southeast Asia
forced them to depart. The Howze Board‘s recommendations and the resultant tests
suddenly became as relevant in the post-Vietnam era as it was before 1965. Indeed, the
tactics might have seemed very familiar to those who experienced the Howze Board‘s
conceptual formation and 11th Air Assault Division‘s testing. These concepts were not
new, but Army Aviation ―ignored – or forgot – them during most of the Vietnam
period.‖338 John Tolson argued that while Vietnam had demonstrated their ―terrific
inherent flexibility by adjusting and modifying tactics to an entirely different
environment,‖ they needed to ―actually unlearn many procedures we used during recent
years of combat in Vietnam.‖339 Despite the renewed relevancy of the Howze Board‘s
findings, just as a decade before, budgetary restrictions made them unrealistic. The air
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assault division, of which Howze originally suggested forming five to be placed around
the world, ultimately never evolved past the demands Vietnam placed upon it.340
Army Aviation might have come a long way, but they once again faced many of
the same criticisms from their early days. Lingering beliefs among airmobility‘s
opponents upheld that helicopters remained too vulnerable in mid- to high-intensity
warfare environments. Proponents countered such criticism by upholding that correct
tactics and techniques – namely nap of the earth flying, very close to the ground surface
under radar and moving quickly – could lessen helicopter vulnerability, mirroring the line
of reasoning used a decade earlier by Howze and others.341
Though the era of fighting for their very existence had passed, Army Aviation
still had to prove their legitimacy in peacetime. As is common in the times of peace
which follow extended war, budgetary restrictions forced reevaluations of organization
and purpose. Yet, like the pre-Vietnam era, much of what Army airmobility practitioners
debated was still theoretical. The war in Europe never came, and with the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989, along with the tumbling edifice that was the moribund Soviet Union
two years later, the likelihood of a war on the plains once again diminished.
Ultimately, what did Vietnam teach Army Aviation? Of what value in the postwar era was a decade of operations, of learning and adapting to a counterinsurgency? The
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denouement of Vietnam was not that it had crippled the once strong organization. Indeed,
they exited Southeast Asia with the best equipped, most advanced and experienced
helicopter force ever put to field. General Westmoreland argued that in the Republic of
Vietnam the Army underwent a ―quiet revolution‖ in the tactics, techniques and
technology of ground warfare.342 That is certainly true of multiple aspects of what they
experienced there; a more suitable explanation for Army Aviation‘s support of the ground
war might be a ―quiet evolution,‖ however. Throughout the conflict they gradually
learned how to employ helicopters in varied tactical environments.
In the beginning of American involvement, the Army‘s aircraft operated in a true
guerrilla war. With the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division and the Pleiku Campaign, Army
Aviation learned how to combat regular forces in a conventional warfare setting. The
subsequent years were a mixture of both counterinsurgent actions and fighting a continual
conventional war against the NVA. Lam Son 719 and its sophisticated anti-aircraft threat
taught pilots and crews how to operate in a mid-intensity environment. Though the
numbers of aviators who gained experience from direct involvement in Laos might have
been few, comprehensive analysis of the operation ensured those lessons gained a broad
audience. The Army‘s employment of helicopters in Southeast Asia, therefore, provided
combat-proven knowledge for distinct environments and tactical applications.
Some have seen wasted opportunities in Vietnam‘s aftermath. Observers like
Major Frank T. Taddonio argue the Army did not take sufficient advantage of the lessons
they gathered in Southeast Asia – the quick return of focus towards Europe did not
exploit ten years of combat airmobile operations. Taddonio posits that the Army became
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preoccupied with attack helicopters in a conventional war during the 1970s and 1980s,
―while the lessons of airmobility learned in Vietnam faded like a bad dream.‖343 To an
extent, he is correct. Institutional antipathy towards an entire war negatively tainted
potentially helpful doctrine. Vietnam may not have contributed a direct transposition of
tactics and procedures into a European environment, but it provided a framework for
future war. Effectively, it was a ―building block to the future,‖ where Army Aviation
―practiced the principles of war.‖344 Their job, then, was to employ the fundamentals
devised in Southeast Asia and tailor new techniques and tactics for likely conflicts.
More importantly, though, Vietnam‘s largest contribution to the future of Army
Aviation was in terms of personal experience. Many of the commanding officers in the
following decades, both infantry and aviation, had completed combat tours in Southeast
Asia. They retained first-hand knowledge about the employment of helicopters in warfare
and easily constituted the most experienced heli-borne military in the world – no other
force could claim the extent of combat accomplishments or battlefield knowledge than
the U.S. Army. Those who did not remain in the active service found a welcome home in
the burgeoning National Guard or Reserves. Merely a skeleton force during the Vietnam
War struggling with outdated equipment and senior pilots, the 1970s inactive Army grew
in men, equipment, and capabilities.345 Would their country call upon them, they
constituted an-already experienced force, most with combat flight hours and competent
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aviators.346 Army Aviation emerged from a decade of war a more respectable
organization that specialized in a proven concept, portending a bright future.
The legacy of Vietnam, despite the Army‘s return to a Euro-centric view of future
war for decades following, is still felt today. Operation Desert Storm in 1990 might not
have given Army Aviation much of an opportunity to refine their operations, but their
impressive performance is testament to sound preparation and training. Though the wars
in which the Army currently finds itself are dissimilar to what they experienced in
Southeast Asia, the principles are still the same – to provide the infantry enhanced
mobility against an insurgency. It is unlikely they will again experience a period of such
vibrant developments and rapid maturity as Vietnam provided.
The solidification of doctrine which George Seneff so incessantly demanded, and
the decades of experience which he bemoaned Army Aviation lacked, have now come to
fruition. Even in 1966 Hamilton Howze could foresee the future benefit of Vietnam.
―What, from a purely military point of view, will come out of the war in Vietnam?‖ he
asked. Experience, he argued, would be the largest benefit. The Army would be able to
boast they were the ―most experienced, modern, battle-wise‖ force in the world. More
importantly, though, is that the bulk of their experience and wisdom ―will pertain to the
use of the air that lies close to the tree tops.‖347
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